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INTRODUCTION
There is a paradox at the heart of veterans' law. Former service members
receive more generous disability, health care, housing, and other public benefits
than those available to indigent or disabled members of the general public.' At
the same time, veterans are subject to anomalous legal principles and practices
* William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I have benefited
greatly from the comments of Mike Allen, Gene Fidell, Heather Gerken, Dana Montalto, Dan
Nagin, Jason Parkin, and Nick Parrillo, the suggestions of participants in the University of
Maryland Faculty Workshop, and conversations with Bethany Li, Margaret Middleton, Patty
Roberts, and Aaron Wenzloff. I am grateful for the superb research assistance of Vera
Eidelman, Ashley Ingram, and Maddie Ranum.
' A veteran without dependents who is rated 100% disabled, for instance, is eligible to
receive $2916 per month, tax free, from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (the "VA").
Compensation: Veterans Compensation Benefits Rate Tables - Effective 12/1/16, U.S. DEP'T
OF VETERANs AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/compensation/resources-comp01.asp
[https://perma.cc/89U7-C5PJ] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
1709
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and isolated from broader developments in administrative and constitutional
law. This veterans' law exceptionalism often undermines the civil rights of
former service members.
Members of the armed forces enjoy fewer workplace protections than other
public and private employees;2 and the theories and doctrines that shape
veterans' law;3 the agencies and courts that adjudicate veterans cases;4 and the
lawyers, lay advocates, and organizations that commonly represent veterans
5
operate largely outside the mainstream of U.S. law and legal institutions. This
legal separation has not aided veterans. In recent decades, moreover, veterans'
law has rarely received the sustained attention of legal scholars6 or legal services
programs,7 nor the scrutiny of attorneys, judges, and bar associations other than
those already primarily engaged in this specialized field.8 There is no inherent
2 See, e.g., Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1) (2012) (defining
"employee" for federal worker compensation scheme as a "civil officer or employee" and
certain other non-military personnel); Gonzalez v. Dep't of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to uniformed
personnel); Verbeck v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 47, 61-62 (2009) (holding that
whistleblower protections of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 do not extend to uniformed
service members).
' See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 135 (1950) (holding military immune in
Federal Tort Claims Act suits for injuries incident to military service).
4 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552-1553 (2012 & Supp. 1 2013-2015) (establishing boards for
correction of military records to upgrade discharge status and make other changes to military
records); 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-7252 (2012) (establishing U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims to review veterans benefits claims).
5 See, e.g., Veterans Affairs, ABA, Legal Services Corp. Announce Program to Help with
Veterans'Disability Claims, A.B.A. (Aug. 11, 2013,4:10 PM), http://www.americanbar.org/
news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/08/veteransaffairsab.html [https://perma.cc/L7FB-
2N36] (announcing partnership to address dearth of legal aid for veterans).
6 Leading law journals have published almost no scholarship on veterans' law in the past
decade, notwithstanding the laudable labors of a small number of scholars. See generally, e.g.,
Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitution Can Tell
Us About the Veterans' Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REv. 501 (2011) [hereinafter Allen,
Due Process]; Michael P. Allen, The United States Court ofAppeals for Veterans Claims at
Twenty: A Proposalfor a Legislative Commission to Consider its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REv.
361 (2009) [hereinafter Allen, Twenty]; Eugene R. Fidell, The Boards for Correction of
Military and Naval Records: An Administrative Law Perspective, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 499
(2013); Daniel L. Nagin, The Credibility Trap: Notes on a VA Evidentiary Standard, 45 U.
MEM. L. REv. 887 (2015).
1 There are a handful of notable exceptions, including CONN. VETERANS LEGAL CTR.,
https://ctveteranslegal.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2017); SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES,
https://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2017); URB. JUST. CTR.'S
VETERANS ADVOC. PROJECT, http://vap.urbanjustice.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
1 Other specialized practice areas have profited from the engagement of thoughtful minds
not steeped within the field. See, e.g., Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation
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logic requiring that veterans' law stand apart from other bodies of law with
which it analytically coheres, such as administrative, disability, public benefits,
and employment law.9 Nor is it apparent that segregating veterans' law cases in
specialized courts, or serving low-income veterans largely outside the existing
network of legal services offices, furthers the interests of veterans. Like other
areas of law that are treated as exceptional,10 veterans' law is a backwater that
generally lags behind developments in constitutional due process, administrative
law, and civil rights law.
Veterans' law is not exceptional because it involves few cases. There are
nearly twenty-two million veterans in the United States," and they and their
dependents file more than one million benefits claims with the U.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs (the "VA") each year,12 in one of the three great federal mass
adjudication systems.13 In addition, veterans file tens of thousands of record
correction applications annually.14
The paradox, then, is this: official recognition that veterans deserve special
treatment has long resulted in more generous benefits than those provided to the
Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal
Proceedings, 33 CARDozo L. REv. 357, 360 (2011) (discussing the initiative of "the Study
Group on Immigrant Representation, convened by Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit").
9 Veterans' law is barely mentioned in leading textbooks on these topics. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, AND CASES (7th ed. 2011); MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2016).
10 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Election Law Exceptionalism? A Bird's Eye View of the
Symposium, 82 B.U. L. REV. 737, 748 (2002) (examining the "ongoing debate about election
law exceptionalism"); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration
Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REv. 1965, 1984 (2013) ("[I]mmigration law remains largely
outside mainstream American constitutional jurisprudence.").
" National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics: Veteran Population, U.S. DEP'T
OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/vetdata/Veteran Population.asp [https://perma.cc/
SG8N-66NE] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
12 Veterans Benefits Administration Reports: VA Claims Inventory, U.S. DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/mmwr/2013/2013 index.asp
[https://perma.cc/5PFG-AE9Z] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) ("VA completed a record-
breaking 1 million claims per year in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012 . . . .").
13 Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
COLUM. L. REv. 1992, 2011 (2012) (discussing Social Security, veterans benefits, and
immigration claims).
14 Fidell, supra note 6, at 501 & nn.21-22 (calculating applications). The most recent
annual Army report states that this service branch alone processed 25,000 applications in
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general public, but also a legal isolation that, over time, has undermined the
interests of former service members.'5 Indeed, at several moments in the past
century, when serious proposals to integrate veterans' programs with other
government programs were raised, powerful voices have objected that to do so
would endanger the special treatment afforded to veterans and risk degrading
their valor and sacrifice. There is no inherent reason, however, that generous
benefits require the exclusion of veterans' law and practice from modem legal
principles and procedures in related areas of law.
Exceptionalism in other areas of the law, such as tax and immigration, is
subject to criticism by many scholars and advocates.16 This article explores the
overlooked costs of veterans' law exceptionalism.'7 It considers how
exceptionalism operates in four areas at the center of contemporary veterans'
law debates, each with significant civil rights consequences: (1) the structure of
judicial review in VA benefits cases; (2) adjudication of disability claims arising
from sexual harassment and assault; (3) the availability of class actions to
address the VA claims backlog and other systemic issues; and (4) procedural
and qualitative shortcomings at the record correction boards, especially
regarding applications by veterans with less-than-honorable discharges, many of
whom carry mental health injuries and suffer a lifetime of stigma, employment
barriers, and benefits ineligibility. Examination of these matters reveals
important deficiencies in the current systems of adjudication. A substantial cause
for these failings is the isolation of veterans' law.
This article concludes that the harms of maintaining veterans' law in isolation
have been significantly underestimated, and that this isolation may be reduced
without forfeiting the beneficial substantive treatment of veterans. To make
veterans' law more consistent with other related disciplines is not to disrespect
the unique courage and sacrifice inherent in military service; rather, it is the
exclusion of veterans from contemporary procedural protections and
adjudicatory values that can no longer be justified.
15 Notably, the segregation of veterans' law and practice mirrors the increasing isolation
of veterans in the broader population, as the number and proportion of households containing
a veteran or member of the military declines. The Military-Civilian Gap: Fewer Family
Connections, PEw RES. CTR. (Nov. 23, 2011) http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/23/
the-military-civilian-gap-fewer-family-connections/ [https://perma.cc/YQF4-PX2Z].
16 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 10, at 737-38 (discussing election law exceptionalism);
Kristin Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference,
90 MINN. L. REv. 1537, 1541 (2006) (discussing judicial deference as an example of tax
exceptionalism).
17 By "veterans' law," I refer to legal regimes to which only former service members (or
their family members) are subject, and in particular, claims for VA benefits and applications
to the U.S. Department of Defense (the "DoD") to correct military records, including to
upgrade a discharge status.
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I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EXCEPTIONALISM AND
HISTORY OF VETERANS' LAW
Evaluation of the impact of veterans' law exceptionalism on contemporary
civil rights struggles requires an understanding of the relevant doctrinal
traditions and regulatory structures. Congress has enacted and amended the twin
statutory schemes governing veterans benefits and record correction matters
over many years. It has legislated against background principles of substantial
judicial deference to military decisionmaking and, in the case of benefits, a
longstanding prohibition on judicial review that was repealed only at the end of
the twentieth century. Part A introduces the concept of legal exceptionalism as
it has been analyzed in other areas of law before Part B provides brief surveys
of the history and current structure of veterans benefits and Part C discusses
adjudication of applications to upgrade a bad discharge.
A. Doctrines ofLegal Exceptionalism
Scholars and other commentators have criticized many areas of law for their
exceptionalism, with tax,18 immigration,19 and family law 20 among the most
egregious modem offenders. In general, the criticism focuses on the adoption or
preservation of anomalous doctrines that depart from developments in
administrative law, due process, federal jurisdiction, or other trans-substantive
areas, without obvious justification. As Paul Caron argued, the tax field must
1" See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court
Exceptionalism, 99 MIN. L. REv. 221, 222 (2014) ("For decades, tax jurisprudence and
scholarship have suffered from what has been labeled 'tax exceptionalism'-the perception
that tax law is so different from the rest of the regulatory state that general administrative law
doctrines and principles do not apply."). Two prominent critics of tax law exceptionalism are
Paul L. Caron and Kristin Hickman. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax
Hyperopia: The Unproven Case ofIncreased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO
ST. L.J. 637, 637 (1996) (criticizing the idea of "tax myopia"); Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or
Mamas Don'tLet YourBabies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 532 (1994)
[hereinafter Caron, Tax Lawyers] (faulting judges in tax cases "for ignoring nontax
developments in statutory construction and legislative process theory"); Hickman, supra note
16, at 1541 (discussing the problems associated with the view that tax law is different or
special).
19 See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 10, at 1969 (looking at immigration exceptionalism
and "its implications for the rights of both citizens and noncitizens"); David S. Rubenstein &
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. L. REV. 583, 584 (2017)
("Immigration law is famously exceptional. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence is littered
with special immigration doctrines that depart from mainstream constitutional norms.").
20 See, e.g., Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies ofFamily Law Exceptionalism-Introduction to the
Special Issue on Comparative Family Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 755 (2010) (analyzing
methods for "de-exceptionalizing the family from the market").
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"start opening up . .. to the light of nontax insights. . . ."21 Those who defend
legal exceptionalism, by contrast, tend to justify these departures on the grounds
of history, complexity, or unique functions and purposes.
Family law exceptionalism exemplifies departures based on history. The
treatment of marriage, divorce, and other domestic relations law as distinct from
other forms of contract traces ancient historical roots, at least to Friedrich Carl
von Savigny's System of the Modem Roman Law.
22 Family law was long said
to be local in nature and separate from market principles,
23 leading to doctrinal
idiosyncrasies such as the "domestic relations" exception to diversity
jurisdiction24-and for centuries shielding sexual discrimination and violence
from ordinary criminal or civil culpability.
25 Veterans' law does not have a
pedigree like family law and its exceptional treatment cannot be justified on the
basis of history alone.
Legal disciplines such as tax, immigration, and patent law have also justified
doctrinal departures on the grounds of complexity. These areas of law are no
doubt complicated, with lengthy, jargon-rich statutes, regulations, and case law.
And yet, the same can be said for many other areas of law as well. To the extent
the "complexity" justification also contains a claim of interdisciplinary
analysis-fluency in patent law, for instance, may require a degree of scientific
knowledge-the same is true for many other areas of law.
26 A claim for doctrinal
exceptionalism based on complexity alone is unpersuasive.
Most compelling, perhaps, is the contention that the function or purpose of a
particular area of law requires a departure from ordinary legal principles.
Judicial deference to certain actions in the area of military or foreign affairs, for
21 Caron, Tax Lawyers, supra note 18, at 589.
22 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE M ODERN ROMAN LAW (William
Holloway trans., Hyperion Press 1979) (1867).
23 JIL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 21 (2014) ("The presumption of family
law's localism is central to the Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence .... ).
24 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-704 (1992) (tracing history of domestic
relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction).
25 See Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARv. L. REv. 1307, 1314-16 (2012) (discussing how perceptions of family roles influenced
the shape of early workplace sex discrimination after Title VII); Emily J. Sack, From the
Right ofChastisement to the Criminalization ofDomestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to
Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 31, 33-34 (2009) (observing that notions of
family privacy delayed the criminalization of domestic violence).
26 See generally Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How Scientific Disciplines
Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2012) (explaining that environmental
law fundamentally depends on environmental science); S. Paul Posner, Book Review, 21
STAN. L. REV. 442 (1969) (discussing foundational use of economics in antitrust law); see also
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark
Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421, 1456 n.200 (2002) (stating that a bankruptcy attorney is held to
a higher standard as to "the level of requisite accounting knowledge" than other lawyers).
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instance, is explained by the need to allow the executive branch latitude to act
swiftly and unconstrained by judicial review.27 For years, a degree of judicial
deference to tax regulations different from the standard rule set forth in Chevron
was defended based on the indispensability of the revenue-raising function to
governance.28 In immigration, the plenary power doctrine has long held that
courts must defer to discriminatory and abusive practices adopted or
implemented by the political branches that "would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens."29 Scholars have condemned any functional justification for this
immigration exceptionalism, which has endured as a formal doctrine even as
courts have significantly eroded its operation in practice.30
Veterans' law exceptionalism cannot be easily defended on the grounds of
history or complexity. As discussed below, there are strong similarities between
adjudication of veterans benefits claims and Social Security claims, for instance,
and many other legal fields, from securities law and antitrust to bankruptcy and
land use law, are arguably more complex than both. Record correction cases, in
turn, are no more complicated than other employment disputes involving claims
of wrongful discharge, whether arising in public or private employment. As for
purpose or function, VA benefits and record correction cases-involving claims
often submitted years or decades after the conclusion of military service, where
the underlying military decision is not itself subject to challenge-would not
seem to implicate the concerns motivating doctrines ofjudicial deference to the
conduct of military affairs. Any functional justification for veterans' law
exceptionalism, however, as well as the ways in which this exceptionalism
undermines the civil rights of veterans, is best evaluated by analyzing their
operation in the legal and policy debates considered below.
27 See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
28 Compare Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 484 (1979)
(holding that Commissioner's reading of regulation § 501(c)(6) of 1954 Internal Revenue
Code "merits serious deference"), with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (establishing a two-step approach for determining the
appropriate level of deference to afford an agency's construction of a statute it administers).
The Supreme Court harmonized the differing levels of deference in Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011) ("We see no reason
why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to
Chevron to the same extent as our review of other regulations.").
29 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). Scholars have also made a functional
argument that judicial deference to political choices may justify "election law
exceptionalism." See Gerken, supra note 10, at 739 (discussing examples of election law
exceptionalism where "the Supreme Court has modified constitutional doctrine to reflect the
unique nature of democratic rights and the political process").
30 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549-50 (1990)
(arguing that the plenary power doctrine "is in some state of decline," but noting that the
"current vitality" of the doctrine is much more complicated).
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B. History and Structure of Veterans Benefits
Compensation for wounded warriors may be as old as armed conflict itself.31
Plymouth Colony provided assistance to those injured in battles with Native
Americans, and the Continental Congress authorized half-pay for veterans
disabled in the Revolutionary War.32 After the establishment of the United
States, claims of disabled veterans first took the form of petitioning to federal
and state legislatures.33 In 1792, Congress assigned adjudication of claims to the
district courts, subject to review by the Secretary of War and Congress.3
4 The
Supreme Court invalidated this structure,3 5 and Congress subsequently
established a Pension Bureau to process claims, without provision for judicial
review.36
After the Civil War, the volume of claims increased dramatically. Claims
agents and increasingly powerful veterans' organizations advocated for
increased benefits and improved administrative processing.37 Politics and
patronage also contributed to the expansion of aid programs.38 In this era, courts
31 James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of
Veterans'Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REv. 135, 137 & nn.8-12 (2011)
(discussing ancient empires that "all had some organized form of benefits for veterans").
32 Mariano Ariel Corcilli, Note, The History of Veterans Benefits: From the Time of the
Colonies to World War Two, 5 U. MIAMINAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REv. 47,49
(2015) (providing a historical overview of how "[t]he United States of America has provided
benefits to veterans since even before the birth of our nation").
3 See, e.g., Ridgway, supra note 31, at 163 ("The tradition of private bills in Congress to
add disappointed claimants to the pension rolls continued through the post-Civil War era.");
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 667, 701-03
(2003) (detailing "the very first petition approved by the very First Congress," for the benefit
of Baron de Glaubeck, "a German who had served in the Revolutionary Army and sought a
pension").
34 Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (repealed in part and amended by Act of Feb.
28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324); Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A
Misinterpretation ofPrecedent, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 527, 529-30 (discussing the history of the
Invalid Pensions Act of 1792).
35 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409,409-11 (1792) (denying mandamus to compel district court
to adjudicate pension claim); see also Ridgway, supra note 31, at 143-45, 145 nn.61-62
(describing unpublished 1794 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Yale Todd).
36 Ridgway, supra note 31, at 148 (discussing 1818-1820 reforms at the Pension Bureau,
which "restored confidence in the pension program").
" Id. at 165-66 (noting how the Grand Army of the Republic helped advocate for more
clerks being authorized for the Pension Bureau, the construction of a building devoted solely
to the administration of veterans benefits, additional pension benefits, and other kinds of
political activities).
3 See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 67-151 (1992).
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refused to review agency decisions adverse to veterans.39 While veterans' groups
succeeded in winning additional staffing and benefits from Congress,40 such that
veterans benefits amounted to an extraordinary 30-40% of the entire federal
budget in the late nineteenth century,41 the agency adjudicating claims was
widely regarded as having deteriorated into a "political patronage system."42
After World War I, Congress reorganized the veterans benefits programs and
imposed new restrictions, including statutes of limitations, higher burdens of
proof, and a requirement that a veteran be disabled, not only elderly, to obtain
support.43 After years of congressional debate and vetoes by two Presidents,
Congress enacted a "bonus" payment program for World War I veterans." In
1930 Congress consolidated several programs into a single entity, the Veterans'
Administration.45
At the start of the New Deal, Congress granted President Franklin Roosevelt
significant power to reorganize government agencies,46 which he deployed to
reform veterans benefits programs and also to reduce payments.47 Congress
insisted, however, that agency decisions about veterans benefits remain immune
from judicial review.48 Notably, shortly after the United States entered World
War II, President Roosevelt attempted to integrate veterans benefits with
programs for other disabled workers, but his attempt failed when veterans'
3 See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 517 (1840) (holding court lacks jurisdiction
to mandamus the Secretary of the Navy to adjudicate or grant claim); Daily v. United States,
17 Ct. Cl. 144, 148 (1881) (same as to benefits denial).
40 See, e.g., Ridgway, supra note 31, at 164-66 (discussing the Arrears Act of 1879 and
the Disability Pension Act of 1890).
41 Id. at 168-69.
42 Id. at 164.
43 Id. at 170 ("The legislation further estricted benefits by requiring (1) medical proof that
a veteran's disability was related to service, (2) that the disability manifested within one year
of service, and (3) that the claim be filed within five years of service.").
4 Id. at 171 ("The law ... provided each veteran of World War I a bonus of a dollar for
each day of service, plus an additional twenty-five cents for each day served overseas .... ").
45 Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 863, 46 Stat. 1016 (authorizing the President to consolidate and
coordinate various agencies affecting veterans); Ridgway, supra note 31, at 175 ("[T]he
Veterans Administration ... was created [in 1930] by uniting the Veterans' Bureau with the
Bureau of Pensions and the National Homes for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.").
46 Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, 48 Stat. 8 (granting the president the power to issue
regulations pertaining to veterans benefits system).
47 Ridgway, supra note 31, at 180-81 ("[Roosevelt] promptly used the broad powers
granted to him by the Act to slash benefits for veterans, freeing money to pay for his New
Deal." (footnote omitted)). Congress overturned many of the Roosevelt reductions in veterans
benefits in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1934. Id. at 180.
48 Economy Act § 5 (declaring that decisions rendered under the title "shall be final and
conclusive" and that "no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction").
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organizations objected.49 In 1944, Congress passed what became known as the
"G.I. Bill," providing education and other benefits to facilitate re-adjustment o
civilian life.50
President Eisenhower sought to rationalize what he believed had become a
confusing and inefficient network of veterans' programs, and appointed General
Omar Bradley to lead a broad review.51 The Bradley Commission recommended
that federal programs focus more specifically on rehabilitation and integration.52
The Commission also suggested that the development of social safety net
programs might obviate the need for some veteran-specific programs.53
However, veterans' groups fiercely resisted the notion that veterans be treated
the same as other citizens or that their special status as former service members
be diminished in any way.54 Congress largely sided with the veterans'
organizations.
The last round of legislative reforms to the structure of veterans benefits
systems occurred in response to the demands of the Vietnam generation, who
founded their own organizations, independent from the powerful and often
conservative groups that had long dominated the political debate about
veterans.55 The Vietnam veterans exposed the horrendous quality of medical
care at many VA hospitals, fought for the recognition of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder ("PTSD"), 56 and eventually secured acknowledgment that Agent
Orange had caused cancers, birth defects, and other diseases.57
49 Ridgway, supra note 31, at 183 ("After a nine-month struggle that bridged the Seventy-
Seventh and Seventy-Eighth sessions of Congress, veterans prevailed and the Disabled
Veterans Rehabilitation Act of 1943 was passed.").
5o Id. at 184-85 (describing the GI. Bill as "the most prominent piece of a comprehensive
program that provided veterans' benefits and preferences"). Southern members of Congress
initially delayed the bill's passage by objecting to making African-American veterans eligible
for benefits. Id. at 185.
1' Id. at 190.
52 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON VETERANS' PENSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
VETERANS' BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 11 (1956).
s1 Id. at 4-5.
54 Ridgway, supra note 31, at 192.
'5 See generally GERALD NICOSIA, HOME TO WAR: A HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS'
MOvEMENT (2001).
56 The American Psychiatric Association added PTSD as a medical diagnosis to its
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980. See Matthew J.
Friedman, PTSD History and Overview, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/PTSD-overview/ptsd-overview.asp
[https://perma.cc/KXA2-YDPS] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
17 See Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.) (establishing a presumption that certain diseases will be
considered service connected, if "associated with exposure to certain herbicide agents").
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The Vietnam veterans had to overcome not only political apathy and
budgetary concerns in Congress but also the opposition of older veterans' groups
who disapproved of the Vietnam generation's anti-war views and regarded
legislation benefitting Vietnam veterans as potentially coming at the expense of
benefits for older generations.5 8 These established organizations also feared
incursions into their political power.59 Nevertheless, the Vietnam generation
persevered. Structurally, their legacy was threefold: (1) creation of a network of
more than 130 community-based, outpatient counseling centers, known as Vet
Centers;60 (2) elevation of the VA to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs;61
and (3) establishment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to
review VA benefits decisions, whose opinions are subject to appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.62
Today, an application for VA benefits begins online or at one of the more than
fifty VA Regional Offices ("VAROs"). 63 VA benefits include health care,
disability compensation, pension, education, burial, and others." However, most
applications are for disability compensation, a program of tax-free monthly
payments that generally requires active-duty service, an honorable or general
5 The denigration of their members' sacrifice by older veterans groups remains evident in
the motto of the Vietnam Veterans of America ("VVA"): "Never again will one generation
of veterans abandon another." About Us, VIET. VETERANS OF AM., https://vva.org/who-we-
are/about-us-history/ [https://perma.cc/E468-3GFF] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017); see also
Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics ofJudicial Structure: Creating the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REv. 155, 162 (1992) ("Although some of the VVA's
deficiency of influence can be traced to the American public's reticence over the Vietnam
War, much of it was linked to the hostility with which the older VSOs viewed the VVA.");
Ridgway, supra note 31, at 196 ("[T]he major veterans' groups initially perceived the
demands of Vietnam veterans .. . as a threat to the funding of programs for the rapidly aging
World War II generation.").
59 Helfer, supra note 58, at 159-62 (noting the immense power of the veteran service
organizations, including their ability to substantially influence the VA and Congress).
6 Ridgway, supra note 31, at 202 ("By 1981, VA had established 137 'Vet Centers' across
the country.").
61 Department of Veterans Affairs Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988).
62 Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). See generally Michael P. Allen, Significant
Developments in Veterans'Law (2004-2006) and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 488 (2007) (discussing the implications of the creation of the
Veterans Court).
63 BARTON F. STICHMAN ET. AL, VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 12.1.1 (2016) [hereinafter
NVLSP MANUAL] (describing the process of submitting a claim for veterans benefits).
6 Id. at 55-65, 719-25, 839-63.
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discharge,65 and proof of a service-connected isability.66 More than 4.1 million
veterans currently receive disability compensation benefits.67
The VA has long been obliged to accept nearly any indication by a veteran
who seeks to apply for benefits, even a short hand-written note,68 and it has a
far-reaching duty to assist the veteran in completing the application and ensuring
its success.69 The VA must give a sympathetic reading to any claim,70 there is
no statute of limitations, and no res judicata, such that a veteran can simply file
a new application rather than appeal a denied claim.7' In addition, there is a
65 Service members who receive bad paper are generally ineligible for VA benefits. 38
C.F.R. § 3.12 (2016). The VA is supposed to conduct its own "character of discharge"
determination and may conclude that a veteran's service is honorable for VA purposes, but in
practice, VAROs rarely do so. See VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, LEGAL SERVS. CTR. OF HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL, UNDERSERVED: How THE VA WRONGFULLY EXCLUDES VETERANS WITH BAD
PAPER 9-17 (NVLSP & Swords to Plowshares 2016) [hereinafter UNDERSERVED]. A
rulemaking petition to address the VA's exclusion of veterans with bad paper is pending. See
Swords to Plowshares et al., Petition for Rulemaking to Amend 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.12(a), 3.12(d),
17.34, 17.36(d) Regulations Interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) Requirement for Service "Under




66 See NVLSP MANUAL, supra note 63, at 55-57 (providing an overview of service-
connected disability compensation).
67 U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL
BENEFITS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 5 (2016), http://www.benefits.va.gov/
REPORTS/abr/ABR-ALLSECTIONS-FY15-12122016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RFS-
A7NK].
68 In 2014, the VA revised a regulation that had permitted informal claims and appeals but
which now requires a veteran to use specified forms. Standard Claims and Appeals Forms, 79
Fed. Reg. 57,695-96 (Sept. 25, 2014). The Federal Circuit recently rejected a rulemaking
challenge to this change. Veterans Justice Grp., LLC v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 818 F.3d
1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
69 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5102(a) (2012) ("Upon request ... the Secretary shall furnish ...
free of all expense, all instructions and forms necessary to apply for that benefit."); id. § 5103
(requiring the Secretary to give the applicant notice of any missing evidence necessary for a
claim); id. § 5103A (detailing the Secretary's duty to assist claimants in obtaining records);
NVLSP MANUAL, supra note 63, at 913-25 (describing the VA's obligations to give the
applicant notice of evidence necessary to complete a successful claim and the VA's
obligations to assist in obtaining records).
70 See, e.g., Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (requiring the
Board to read "filings by claimants 'in a liberal manner,' regardless of whether the claimant
is represented by an attorney").
71 A veteran may reopen old claims based on new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C. § 5108
(allowing reconsideration of disallowed claims based on new and material evidence). A prior
decision is also subject to revision if there was a clear and unmistakable error, or the veteran
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network of lay advocates, accredited by the VA 7 2 and present at all or nearly all
VAROs, available to assist the veteran in completing the application and
developing additional evidence, without charge.73 Finally, lawyers are rarely
involved in VARO applications. Almost no legal services offices offer
representation to veterans in their VARO proceedings, and federal statutes
prohibit private lawyers from charging a fee for assistance in the initial
applications.74 The absence of legal representation does not benefit veterans.75
In recent years, the VAROs have received and adjudicated over one million
applications annually, of which approximately 33% are first-time claims and
67% involve supplemental claims for additional benefits or the resubmission of
previously denied claims.76 The VA aspires to adjudicate each application within
125 days of submission but often fails to do so. For example, in 2012, 68% of
applications were pending for more than 125 days.77 Delays at the initial
application stage have declined,78 in part because the VA has redeployed
appellate staff-leading to grotesque delays in administrative appeals.79
may simply resubmit he same claim again after a denial. Id. § 5109A; see Allen, Due Process,
supra note 6, at 508-09 (arguing res judicata concerns are less significant because veterans
can reopen claims based on "clear and unmistakable error").
72 38 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5902, 5904 (providing for the recognition of such advocates by the
VA); 38 C.F.R. § 14.629 (2016) (stating requirements for accrediting service organization
representatives, agents, and attorneys).
7 NVLSP MANUAL, supra note 63, at 1421-26 (describing the roles and importance of lay
advocates).
74 See A.B.A., supra note 5 (launching a pilot program through which attorneys will offer
pro bono services to veterans); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (prohibiting agents and
attorneys from charging fees for filing a claim for benefits); Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, §
6, 12 Stat. 566, 568 (describing the limits on fees for attorneys helping veterans file a claim
for pension or benefits). A relatively small number of law school clinics also provide
representation to veterans. See Karen Sloan, Law Clinics Answer the Call: Veterans Finding
Allies in Dealing with VA and More, NAT'L L.J. ONLINE, July 6, 2015, Lexis Advance.
1 See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Justice Delayed; Justice Denied? Causes and Proposed
Solutions Concerning Delays in the Award ofVeterans'Benefits, 5 U. MIAMINAT'L SECURITY
& ARMED CONFLICT L. REv. 1, 23-25 (2015) (arguing expanded role for lawyers in initial
claims stage would reduce claims backlog).
76 See U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., supra note 12.
7 Veterans Benefits Administration Reports: 2012 Monday Morning Workload Reports,
U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/mmwr/historical/
2012/index.asp [https://perma.cc/7VFR-G6H8] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
78 Veterans Benefits Administration Reports: Claims Backlog, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFF., http://benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/detailed claimsdata.asp [https://perma.cc/4KWT-
BVX7] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) ("Claims Backlog" tab) (showing approximately 80,000
initial and supplemental claims pending more than 125 days, down from a high of 611,000
such claims in March 2013).
79 MARK LANCASTER, FIXING THE APPEALS PROCESS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
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A veteran who objects to the VARO's disposition of a claim may file a Notice
of Disagreement with the local VA office.80 The veteran may request an in-
person hearing at the VARO, 81 an informal proceeding that resembles a "fair
hearing" in the public benefits context,82 or proceed directly with an
administrative appeal to the Board of Veterans Appeals (the "BVA"). The
VARO then prepares a written decision, called a Statement of the Case.
83 In
fiscal year 2015, VAROs took an average of 419 days to prepare a written
decision explaining the disposition decision the VARO had already made.84
To prosecute a BVA appeal, the veteran files a notice of appeal.85 In fiscal
year 2015, it took an average of 537 days for VAROs to certify the record to the
BVA.86 It then took another nine months or so for the BVA, acting in single-
judge panels, to adjudicate each appeal.87 In 2015, the BVA received about
52,000 appeals and decided about 56,000, for which it held nearly 13,000
hearings (59% by videoconference).88 The Board remanded in about one-half of
these cases, allowed the appeal in about one-third, and denied the appeal in about
one-fifth.89
Until 1989, there was no further appeal available.90 Since the Veterans'
Judicial Review Act (the "VJRA"), however, veterans may appeal to the U.S.
AFFAIRS 11 (2014), http://luskin.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/14-VeteransAffairsI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8VQ-VJGY ] ("Some experts believe that the most significant cause of the
appeals increase is that the VA shifted almost all its appeals personnel over to claims
processing.").
80 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012).
8' The hearing is held before a "Decision Review Officer" or DRO. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2600
(2016). The veteran may appear with a veterans service organization or counsel, present
testimony, witnesses, and evidence, and respond to questions from the hearing officer. Id.;
see also id. § 3.103(c)-(d).
82 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 22 (McKinney 2003) (describing a hearing in the
public benefits context in the state of New York).
83 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.26, 19.29.
84 BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT FIscAL
YEAR 2015, at 21 (2016), http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans-Annual-Rpts/
BVA2015AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH4J-9AC2].
85 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 19.30.
86 BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, supra note 84, at 21.
87 Id. (reporting in fiscal year 2015, the BVA took 270 days on average to adjudicate an
appeal once received).
8 Id. at 18, 26, 29.
89 In fiscal year 2015, the BVA allowed 31% of disability compensation appeals, remanded
47%, and denied 17.78%. Id. at 26.
90 The Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception for constitutional claims. See
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974) (holding U.S. district courts had jurisdiction
to adjudicate claims of unconstitutional race discrimination).
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Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "CAVC"). 91 Approximately 3000-
4500 CAVC appeals have been filed annually in recent yearS92-about 10% of
the veterans who appeal to the BVA and 0.5% of those who first apply at the
VARO. The CAVC decides nearly all appeals on the papers, holding almost no
oral arguments,93 and acts primarily through single-judge panels.94 Empowered
to "affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of the Board or to remand the matter,
as appropriate,"95 the CAVC is precluded from making its own factual
determinations.96 Nearly half the veterans who seek review at the CAVC are pro
se upon filing the appeal, but this number declines significantly by the time of
decision.97 The CAVC adjudicates appeals in about eight months, affirming in
about one-tenth of its cases, dismissing the appeal in about one-tenth, remanding
in about one-quarter, and ordering some combination of a partial affirmance,
dismissal, and remand in the rest.98
9' Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
92 See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT: OCTOBER 1, 2014
TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2015 (FISCAL YEAR 2015) 1 (2015), http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
documents/FY2015AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9BV-KXLC] [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT FY2015] (4506 appeals filed); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS,
ANNUAL REPORT: OCTOBER 1, 2013 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 (FISCAL YEAR 2014) 1 (2014),
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2014AnnualReport06MAR1 5FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3QT-DPJD] [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT FY2014] (3745 appeals filed);
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT: OCTOBER 1, 2012 TO
SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 (FISCAL YEAR 2013) 1 (2013), http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
documents/FY2013AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/9857-Z89F] [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT FY2013] (3521 appeals filed).
9 ANNUAL REPORT FY2015, supra note 92, at 4 (fourteen oral arguments held); ANNUAL
REPORT FY2014, supra note 92, at 4 (twenty oral arguments held); ANNUAL REPORT FY2013,
supra note 92, at 4 (nineteen oral arguments held).
94 ANNUAL REPORT FY2015, supra note 92, at 1 (1851 cases were decided by a single
judge); ANNUAL REPORT FY2014, supra note 92, at 1 (2036 cases were decided by a single
judge); ANNUAL REPORT FY2013, supra note 92, at 1 (1960 cases were decided by a single
judge).
9 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2012).
9 Id. § 7261(c).
97 At the time of filing between 27% and 38% of all appeals are filed pro se. These numbers
drop to between 12% and 21% at the time of disposition. ANNUAL REPORT FY2015, supra
note 92, at 1; ANNUAL REPORT FY2014, supra note 92, at 1; ANNUAL REPORT FY2013, supra
note 92, at 1. This reduction is due to the work of the Veterans Consortium Pro Bono Program,
which screens pro se filings and places many with volunteer counsel. See THE VETERANS
CONSORTIUM PRO BONO PROGRAM, http://www.vetsprobono.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
98 ANNUAL REPORT FY2015, supra note 92, at 2-3.
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Either the veteran or the VA may appeal further, to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, on the ground of legal error.99 In fiscal year 2015, there
were eighty appeals to the Federal Circuit' 0 0-about 2% of cases heard by the
CAVC, 0.14% of cases heard by the BVA, and 0.008% of cases filed in the
VAROs. Finally, the Supreme Court has granted a handful of petitions for
certiorari in veterans benefits cases.101
C. Record Correction and Discharge Review Boards
The term "bad paper" refers to an other-than-honorable, bad conduct, or
dishonorable discharge, and may include a general discharge as well. A veteran
with bad paper is generally ineligible for VA benefits, including disability
compensation, pension, and health care,102 as well as housing and employment
programs. Discharge status is also a powerful barrier to private-sector
employment as many large employers request discharge paperwork and decline
to hire veterans with a bad paper discharge. Veterans with bad paper are more
likely to suffer mental health conditions or homelessness and to be involved with
the criminal justice system, and they take their own lives twice as often as other
veterans.103 In this regard, a bad paper discharge for former service members has
many of the same adverse employment consequences as a criminal conviction
has for ex-offenders.1" Bad paper is deeply shameful, imposing a lifetime
stigma that marks the former service member as having failed family, friends,
and country.
105
9 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
100 ANNUAL REPORT FY2015, supra note 92, at 4. In fiscal year 2014, there were only 115
appeals to the Federal Circuit. ANNUAL REPORT FY2014, supra note 92, at 4.
101 See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011) (deciding whether the
deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court has any jurisdictional
consequences).
102 The narrow exceptions to bad paper are grudgingly applied by VA adjudicators. See,
e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5303(b) (describing an exception where veteran was "insane" at the time of
misconduct resulting in bad paper discharge); 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a) (2016); Gardner v.
Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 415, 420 (2009) (faulting the VA for unduly narrow construction and
application of "insanity" exception). The VA also routinely fails to undertake a "character of
service" determination to assess whether the military service of a veteran with bad paper is
nevertheless honorable for VA purposes, such that one's benefits eligibility is preserved. See
Swords to Plowshares et al., supra note 65, at 75-79.
103 VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, LEGAL SERVS. CTR. OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note
65, at 2.
'" See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status,
and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REv. 893, 902-15 (2014)
(analyzing negative employment consequences of reliance on criminal history).
105 CONN. VETERANS LEGAL CTR., VETERANS DISCHARGE UPGRADE MANUAL 9-10 (2011).
[Vol. 97:17091724
VETERANS' LA WEXCEPTIONALISM
The discharge process has become more formalized in modem times, but it is
still largely a matter of rough justice. Often, service members are hastily
discharged in the field. Marginalized populations, such as service members of
color'0 6 and those who report sexual harassment or assault,107 are at increased
risk of a bad discharge, as were gay and lesbian service members before 2011.108
So too are those struggling with the invisible wounds of PTSD or Traumatic
Brain Injury ("TBI") 10 9 or other mental health injuries.1 10 During the Vietnam
106 DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY
JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES 33-36 (1972) (concluding that in Vietnam era, African-
American service members were twice as likely to receive a bad paper discharge as white
service members); PROTECT OUR DEFS., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN MILITARY JUSTICE: FINDINGS
OF SUBSTANTIAL AND PERSISTENT RACIAL DISPARITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
JUSTICE SYSTEM i (2017), http://www.protectourdefenders.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/05/Report_20.pdf [https://perma.cc/964Q-MCHH] ("[F]or every year reported and
across all service branches, black service members were substantially more likely than white
service members to face military justice or disciplinary action. . . ."); see also David F.
Addlestone & Susan Sherer, Battleground: Race in Vietnam, 292 C.L. 1, 1-2 (1973)
(describing "institutionalized racism of the military" during Vietnam War). This racial
discrimination was so severe that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission concluded
that employers who relied on discharge status in hiring or promotion might be liable for
unlawful employment discrimination. EEOC Decision No. 74-25, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 265-66 (1975).
107 Booted: Lack of Recourse for Wrongfully Discharged U.S. Military Rape Survivors,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 19, 2016) [hereinafter HRW, Booted], https://www.hrw.org/
report/2016/05/19/booted/lack-recourse-wrongfully-discharged-us-military-rape-survivors#
page [https://perma.cc/G8U7-3KP2] (finding that service members who reported a sexual
assault are particularly susceptible to retaliatory bad discharges).
101 Dave Philipps, Ousted as Gay, Aging Veterans Are Battling Again, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2015, at Al ("By some estimates, as many as 100,000 service members were discharged
for being gay between World War II and the 2011 repeal of the military's 'don't ask, don't
tell' policy. Many were given less-than-honorable discharges that became official scarlet
letters-barring them from veterans' benefits, costing them government jobs and other
employment, and leaving many grappling with shame for decades.").
10 Dave Philipps, Veterans Want Past Discharges to Recognize Post-Traumatic Stress,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2016, at A9 ("Congress has recognized in recent years that some of these
discharges were the fault of dysfunctional screening for PTSD and other combat injuries, and
it has put safeguards in place to prevent more-including requirements for mental health
professionals to review all discharges.").
110 See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1013T, DEFENSE HEALTH
CARE: STATUS OF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH PERSONALITY DISORDER
SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS (2010); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-31,
DEFENSE HEALTH CARE: ADDITIONAL EFFORTS NEEDED To ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
PERSONALITY DISORDER SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS 7 (2008) ("DOD does not have
reasonable assurance that its key personality disorder separation requirements have been
followed."); MELISSA ADER ET AL., CASTING TROOPS ASIDE: THE UNITED STATES MILITARY'S
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War, 260,000 service members received bad paper,"' fewer than 3% of those
who served, but since 2001, approximately 6.5% of service members (over
135,000 persons) have received bad paper.1 12
Negative administrative discharges began in 1892,113 and legislative
petitioning was a veteran's only recourse until World War I1,114 when veterans'
organizations lobbied successfully to establish an administrative review
process.115 A provision of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944
established a discharge review board ("DRB") in each service branch,
1 16 and
two years later Congress created the boards for correction of military records
("BCMRs") as well, while also banning private bills. 17 The broad purpose of
the 1944 Act was to legislate a "bill of rights to facilitate the return of service
men and women to civilian life."' 18 As Representative Cunningham explained,
Congress was especially concerned about young service members who, "scared
to death," mistakenly agreed to a bad paper discharge.
ILLEGAL PERSONALITY DISORDER DISCHARGE PROBLEM 1 (2012),
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/VLSCCastingTroopsAside.p
df [https://perma.cc/2FM6-3E4G] (finding that DoD systematically issues unlawful bad paper
discharges to servicemen with alleged personality disorders); BLAKE BOGHOSSIAN ET AL.,
DISORDER IN THE COAST GUARD: THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD'S ILLEGAL PERSONALITY
AND ADJUSTMENT DISORDER DISCHARGES 1 (2014), https://www.law.yale.edu/
system/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/vlsc disorderintheCoastGuard.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5APL-ELAN] (finding that "[t]he vast majority of [adjustment disorder] and [personality
disorder] discharges failed to comply with Coast Guard regulations"); Joshua Kors, How
Specialist Town Lost His Benefits, NATION, Apr. 9,,2007, at 11.
1" See Rebecca Izzo, Comment, In Need of Correction: How the Army Board for
Correction of Military Records is Failing Veterans with PTSD, 123 YALE L.J. 1587, 1588
(2014).
112 UNDERSERVED, supra note 65, at 2.
113 DAVID F. ADDLESTONE ET AL., MILITARY DISCHARGE UPGRADING AND INTRODUCTION
TO VETERANS ADMINISTRATION LAW: A PRACTICE MANUAL 1/2 (1982).
114 Fidell, supra note 6, at 500; see also Ogden v. Zuckert, 298 F.2d 312, 313 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
" ADDLESTONE ET AL., supra note 113, at 1/2. The U.S. military court martialed one of
every eight service members during World War II, and more than 15% of those veterans
received a bad discharge. This poor treatment of so many World War II veterans motivated
veterans' organizations to press for some form of review. Id. at n.9.
116 Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 1553 (2012)).
" Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, § 207, 60 Stat. 812, 837 (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 1552); see John J. Field, Military Personnel Law: Waiving the Discretionary
Statute of Limitations Governing the Boards for Correction of Military Records, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 920, 934 (1994) (analyzing historical context of statute).
118 S. REP. No. 78-755, at 2 (1944).
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A boy gets into trouble when he is in the service .... That boy might be
scared by his commanding officer or someone over him and sign a
statement that he was a deserter or admit that he was a deserter, and be
kicked out for that reason, when, as a matter of fact, he was not a
deserter.... If he had not been scared to death or had been properly
defended before a court martial, it may have been proven that he was only
absent without leave. It was the thought of the committee in approving this
that it would open the door for these boys to present any evidence that they
could get to clear up their record.1 19
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter established a Special Discharge Review
Program to upgrade the status of Vietnam veterans with bad paper,120 but
Congress swiftly overruled the order, enacting legislation denying VA benefits
to any veteran whose discharge status was upgraded under the Carter Program,
unless affirmed under uniform standards by a discharge review board.121 For
nearly all veterans, the legislation nullified the effect of the Carter Program.
Procedures before the boards are straightforward. On application, a DRB may
review a bad discharge, except one resulting from a general court-martial, and
must grant an in-person hearing upon request.122 These hearings are conducted
before a panel of five officers, who hear fact and expert testimony, admit
records, and render decisions. 123 The statute of limitations for application to a
DRB is fifteen years and is not waivable.124 An adverse decision from a DRB
may be appealed to the relevant BCMR, but it is also a final agency action
subject to judicial review.125 DRBs appear to grant approximately 30-40% of
discharge upgrade applications when the veteran exercises the right to a personal
appearance,126 and far fewer when review is based solely on the papers
119 78 CONG. REC. 4538 (1944).
120 Warren Brown, Bills Would Deny Benefits for Upgraded Discharges, WASH. POST,
June 1, 1977, at A6.
121 Act of Oct. 8, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-126, 91 Stat. 1106.
122 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a).
123 Id.
124 Id.
12S Fidell, supra note 6, at 500-03.
126 See Complaint at 26, Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14-cv-00260 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2014),
ECF No. 1 ("[O]f all veterans who applied to the [Army Board for Correction of Military
Records, or] ABCMR (2009, 2010, and 2012) for any reason, or for discharge upgrades to the
Army Discharge Review Board ... (2009, 2010, and 2012) or NDRB (2007-2013), 30.58%
of their records were corrected, according to the National Veterans Legal Services Program.").
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submitted to the board.127 Veterans represented by counsel before the DRBs
have a higher success rate.128
BCMRs have broader jurisdiction, but they rarely grant a request for a
personal appearance.129 They also approve applications at a lower rate, and have
been widely criticized for their poor quality of adjudication.130 These boards
have a shorter statute of limitations, three years compared to the DRBs' fifteen
years, but it is waivable in the interest of justice.13 1 BCMRs have sweeping
statutory powers to upgrade a discharge when "necessary to correct an error or
remove an injustice." 32
Decisions of the record correction boards are subject to judicial review
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").1 33 In the 1970s and
1980s, there was significant litigation of these cases, including a successful
class-action challenge to illegal urinalysis procedures leading to bad
discharges,134 and repeated suits to invalidate a regulation unlawfully imposing
a statute of limitations on motions to reconsider.135 Discharge upgrade litigation,
however, nearly disappeared until the mid-2000s.
The absence of legal representation for veterans seeking a record correction
has left the boards free to act with impunity, and, unfortunately, they have often
done so. The boards make public little information about their outcomes or case-
handling procedures,136 and practitioners report the sort of routine violations of
127 Kathleen Gilberd, Upgrading Less-Than-Fully-Honorable Discharges, in THE
AMERICAN VETERANS AND SERVICEMEMBERS SURVIVAL GUIDE 346, 348 (2009) (finding that
the success rate for upgrade applicants who did not appear before the Air Force Discharge
Review Board was only 15% compared to 45% for those who did appear); see also
ADDLESTONE ET AL., supra note 113, at 1/3.
128 ADDLESTONE ET AL., supra note 113, at 9/14 & n.64 (reporting on pilot program and
finding that "82% of the applicants represented [by an attorney] received an upgrade in
discharge").
129 Fidell, supra note 6, at 502 ("The Army Board for Correction of Military Records
conducted no live hearings in fiscal year 2012. The [Board for Correction of Naval Records,
or] BCNR has not conducted one in the last twenty years. The Coast Guard board has not
conducted one in the last ten years.").
130 Id. at 502-03 ("[O]ne of the correction boards-the BCNR-is given to short-form
letter rulings that are often little more than boilerplate."); id. at 503-05 (describing the
complicated procedural history and controversy of "a case from hell").
'' 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (2012).
132 Id. § 1552(a)(1).
133 See, e.g., Blassingame v. Sec'y of Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
courts should apply APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
134 Giles v. Sec'y of Army, 627 F.2d 554, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
135 See, e.g., Lipsman v. Sec'y of Army, 335 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53-55 (D.D.C. 2004)
(invalidating ABCMR regulation that unlawfully imposed a one-year statute of limitations on
motions to reopen).
136 Fidell, supra note 6, at 506 (describing effort to obtain basic board statistics).
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basic notions of procedural due process and administrative law that recall horror
stories of an earlier, pre-Goldberg v. Kelly era.137 In just the small number of
cases handled by the Veterans Legal Services Clinic at Yale, for instance,
BCMRs have relied on secret evidence never shared with the applicant,1 38
summarily denied applications with boilerplate language,13 9 ignored arguments
of counsel,140 applied a board regulation previously enjoined as unlawful by a
federal court,141 rejected an application for failure to comply with an ultra vires
rule not set forth in regulations,142 and denied relief without a hearing in every
case not remanded from the district court.
In short, in VA benefits and record correction cases-two principal areas of
veterans' law practice-former service members confront specialized courts,
doctrines, and practices. The consequences of veterans' law exceptionalism for
the civil rights of former service members are considered next.
II. EXCEPTIONALISM AND VA BENEFITS
This Section examines three contemporary issues in veterans benefits law and
the role that veterans' exceptionalism plays in each: (1) the structure ofjudicial
review; (2) adjudication of disability claims arising from military sexual trauma
("MST"); and (3) collective actions and the backlog of benefits appeals. Each
controversy implicates important civil rights concerns, and, in each, the
malignant influence of veterans' law exceptionalism is manifest.143
'7 See id. at 503-05 (describing "case from hell" remanded seven times by district court);
Izzo, supra note 111, at 1596-1600 (summarizing and quoting cases); see generally Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
138 See Amended Complaint at 10, Shepherd v. McHugh, No. 3:11-cv-00641 (D. Conn.
dismissed Nov. 17, 2013), ECF No. 51 (describing the ABCMR's reliance on secret evidence
withheld from veteran and his counsel); Izzo, supra note 111, at 1600 (arguing that the
ABCMR relied on evidence to which the applicant and his counsel had no access).
"I Cowles v. McHugh, No. 3:13-cv-01741, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138927, at *33 (D.
Conn. Sept. 30, 2014) (concluding that the ABCMR "simply relied upon the presumptive
legitimacy" of the Army diagnosis); Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 8-9 (alleging
ABCMR rejected application with summary language and conclusory reasoning).
140 Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 10 (alleging that the ABCMR did not address
several of the applicant's arguments in its denial of a discharge upgrade).
141 Complaint at 9, Dolphin v. McHugh, No. 3:12-cv-01578 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2014),
ECF No. 1 (challenging the ABCMR's rejection of application as time-barred under 32 C.F.R.
§ 581.3(g)(4)(ii)).
142 Complaint at 10, Spires v. James, No. 3:16-cv-01905 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 18, 2016),
ECF No. 1 (alleging that the ABCMR "ignored its own rules" when it returned the plaintiffs
application for lack of a service number).
143 These issues do not exhaust the menu of contemporary civil rights struggles involving
the VA. The agency continues to lag years behind science in recognizing the disabling
consequences of toxic exposure. See, e.g., The Few, the Proud, the Forgotten v. U.S. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, No. 3:16-cv-00647, 2017 WL 2312354, at *18 (D. Conn. May 26, 2017)
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A. Structure ofJudicial Review
Access to courts and to meaningful judicial review is fundamental to the civil
rights of veterans. The congressional decision to establish judicial review of
veterans' benefits claims was controversial in 1988,14 but there has been no
significant effort since then to eliminate judicial review and return to the
"splendid isolation" of the prior 150 years.
145 Rather, the debate since 1988 has
centered on the efficacy of the anomalous structure Congress created: an Article
I court, constructed like an appeals court but situated like a district court beneath
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Moreover, the CAVC behaves
like a trial court in important ways-deciding nearly all appeals by a single-
judge panel in decisions that are not binding on other single-judge panels or even
that particular judge in the future.146 Unlike a district court, however, the CAVC
almost never hears oral argument, denying litigants an opportunity to be heard
(denying in large part summary judgment motion by the VA in Freedom of Information Act
suit for records regarding adjudication of disability claims arising from contaminated
groundwater at Camp Lejeune). There is a critical need for better access to mental health care.
VA Conducts Nation's Largest Analysis of Veteran Suicide, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF.
(July 7, 2016, 9:56 AM), http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfmn?id=
2 801
[https://perma.cc/YY4C-H4PX] (discussing VA finding that twenty veterans died from
suicide each day in 2014). The VA wrongfully excludes thousands of veterans with bad paper
from medical or disability benefits, see Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 65, at 1, and the
VA has failed to police abuse of education benefits by for-profit colleges, see Gardiner Harris,
Veterans Groups Seek Crackdown on Deceptive Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2016, at A4.
144 NIcOSIA, supra note 55, at 299-300 (discussing campaign to reform the VA); Helfer,
supra note 58, at 159-62 (outlining arguments made by veterans service organizations against
allowing judicial review).
145 Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 364. Nicholas Bagley has argued that "[b]ecause of the
demands of judicial review, [VA] disability decisions have swelled in length and intricacy."
Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption ofReviewability, 127 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1288
(2014). Bagley characterizes the establishment of judicial review for VA claims as
congressional capitulation to years of judicial rulings favoring reviewability, but that is not
the account contained in more detailed legislative histories. See Helfer, supra note 58, at 159-
67; Ridgway, supra note 31, at 213-16. Nor is Bagley's claim that judicial review is a
significant factor in the VA's claim backlog consistent with more comprehensive analyses of
the delays in adjudication. See Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 377-78; James D. Ridgway,
The Veterans'Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later: Confronting the New Complexities of
the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 251, 265 (2010) ("The changes
brought by the VJRA have had a radical impact on the efficiency and accuracy of VA's ability
to adjudicate claims.").
146 38 U.S.C. § 7254 (2012); see James D. Ridgway, Barton F. Stichman & Rory E. Riley,
"Not Reasonably Debatable": The Problems with Single-Judge Decisions by the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 23-41 (2016) (reviewing 4000
single-judge opinions and finding significant variation in outcome and repeated violation of
rule against single-judge panel deciding novel issue).
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in person47 and depriving the court of the give-and-take between counsel and
the bench that aids other courts in fashioning practical solutions to otherwise
paper-bound problems.
Some judges of the CAVC have questioned the need for two levels of
appellate review (CAVC and Federal Circuit), suggesting that Congress should
constitute the CAVC as a full-fledged Article III court, end Federal Circuit
appeals, and make CAVC decisions reviewable only on certiorari to the Supreme
Court.148 Conversely, scholars have noted that the CAVC itself might be
eliminated, channeling appeals from the BVA directly to the Federal Circuit.149
At a minimum, the unusual structure of VA appeals, which can journey through
four levels of review as of right, together with the widespread frustration at
overwhelming delays and the high error rate on appeal, suggests that the current
system warrants reform.
The most radical reform proposal in recent years has been James T. O'Reilly's
suggestion that Congress eliminate the BVA and the CAVC and "replace both
with the appeals process already in place at the Social Security
Administration." 50 This involves an initial application at a local Social Security
Administration ("SSA") office or online, referral of eligible claimants to a state
government agency under contract with the SSA, and an opportunity for de novo
review of adverse decisions by an Administrative Law Judge ("AL"), which by
law must be held within seventy-five miles of the claimants' home.151 These are
non-adversarial, in-person hearings, and frequently involve unrepresented
claimants submitting new evidence or arguments.152 From there, a claimant may
seek review by the Appeals Council-a national body-and then in the district
147 In recent years, the CAVC has held approximately twenty oral arguments annually, in
fewer than 1% of the appeals docketed. See ANNUAL REPORT FY2015, supra note 92, at 4.
148 See Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 399-402. Allen notes that Congress could convert
the CAVC to an Article III court while retaining the role of the Federal Circuit, somewhat
like the Court of International Trade (an Article III court whose decisions are subject to review
in the Federal Circuit). Id. at 399.
149 See id. at 404-05, 409; James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the
Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REv.
223, 243-45 (2001).
Iso O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 243. O'Reilly concludes that the CAVC has been subject
to regulatory capture by government lawyers, leading to endless remands and recycling of
cases. Id. at 249 ("An Article III judge can take or leave an agency's goodwill and affection,
secure in his or her life tenure and diversity of constituencies. The smaller the universe for
the Article I judge, however, the less willing might one be to challenge the vision of the world
held by the Article I agency to which the judge is appended.").
I"1 Id. at 244 (citing 2 HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURE
§ 563 (3d ed. 1983)); see also HAROLD J. KRENT & Scorr MORRIS, ACHIEvING GREATER
CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABiLITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND
SUGGESTED REFORMS 5-6 (2013).
152 O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 244.
2017] 173 1
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
court in the district where the claimant resides.153 Further appeal is available in
the regional courts of appeals, rather than to specialized courts like the CAVC
or Federal Circuit.
The SSA appeals system is widely regarded as superior to the "VA morass"l
54
not only in efficiency but also in fairness. The "national dispersal of the ALJ
hearings and of the reviewing district courts bring the adjudications closer to the
individual claimant"155 and conveys a "sense of due process observed in
person."l56 The importance of procedural justice in earning the respect and
acceptance of decisions by claimants has been confirmed by substantial social
science research.57 O'Reilly's proposal was a formal "merger" of the VA claims
system with the SSA disability review process,58 whereby initial applications
for veterans benefits would still begin at a VARO, but appeals would proceed
through the SSA system, first to a local SSA ALJ, then to the SSA Appeals
Council, and finally to the local district court.15 9
Less dramatically, Michael P. Allen proposed enactment of a legislative
commission to review the work of the CAVC and to consider reforms to improve
processing of VA benefits claims.160 Allen applauds the establishment ofjudicial
review and credits the CAVC with developing a body of law that has brought a
measure of predictability and transparency to the VA system,161 as well as with
increasing the quality of administrative adjudications.162 Nevertheless, Allen has
"s 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012); O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 244.
154 O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 243 (portraying the SSA's use of ALJ as a model) (citing
Charles L. Cragin, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Department of Veterans Affairs'
Claims Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans'Appeals, 46 ME.
L. REv. 23, 40 (1994)).
I O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 244.
156 Id.
1I See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283, 297-301 (2003) (examining why society may view a procedure as fair).
158 O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 245 (arguing for the conversion of "the unworkable mess
[of VA claims] into a subset of the SSA adjudication appeals process").
19 Id. at 246. Allen has also noted the possible benefits of abandoning centralized review,
and its attendant uniformity, in favor of regionalizing administrative appeals by the BVA, or
even judicial review via district courts. Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 406-07 & nn.244-
4 5.
However, his proposals for regional review still depend on a single streamlined appeal to the
CAVC or Federal Circuit. Id. at 407.
160 Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 406-07, 407 nn.244-45.
161 Id. at 372-73; see also Ridgway, supra note 145, at 265 ("[T]he VJRA brought
numerous forms of transparency and accountability to bear upon [VA adjudications], which
pushed towards increased complexity.").
162 Allen identifies the CAVC's "rigorous enforcement of the statutory requirement that
the Board provide adequate reasons and bases for its decisions" as especially important in this
improvement. Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 377.
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advocated for a re-examination of the system for judicial review of veterans
benefits claims, emphasizing a set of modest potential improvements.163
It is easy to justify judicial review of veterans benefits claims, but it is difficult
to defend the current system. Claims languish for months or years, churned in
the "hamster wheel"l64 of appeals and remands. The CAVC rarely sits for
argument, and appears to litigants more like another level of administrative
review, laboring in a narrow, ghettoized world of veterans' law. Much criticism
within the veterans' law community has focused on the four layers of review,
and the particular failings of the VAROs and BVA, but this account has
overlooked a broader structural problem that is familiar to federal courts scholars
and a powerful manifestation of veterans' law exceptionalism: the deficiencies
of the CAVC as a specialized court.
The common justifications for a specialized court include a heightened need
for uniformity, efficiency concerns, and an expectation that expertise must be
applied to complex law or facts. Uniformity considerations animated the
establishment of the Court of Customs Appeals, one of the country's first
specialized courts,165 and played a prominent role in the creation of the Federal
Circuit in 1982, to which Congress channeled all patent appeals.166 Efficiency
arguments suggest that  specialized court might be of value where the law or
underlying facts are complex, such as in tax or patent cases, or perhaps where
the cases are routine.167 Finally, the complexity justification holds that in
16 Id. at 395-97 (suggesting commission might recommend funding more judges,
permitting informal discovery, improving training for VARO adjudicators, and adopting a
CAVC summary disposition rule); see id. at 403-04 (discussing congressional expansion of
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction to include review of factual findings, and of the CAVC
to make factual determinations, as well as codifying explicit authority for the CAVC to hear
aggregate litigation).
164 See, e.g., Veterans' Dilemma: Navigating the Appeals System for Veterans Claims:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem'1 Affairs of the H. Comm.
on Veterans' Affairs, 114th Cong. 36 (2015) (statement of Bart Stichman, Joint Executive
Director, National Veterans Legal Services Project).
165 Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (1990) ("[T]he creation of the Court of Customs Appeals in 1909
was premised in large part on the special evils of dis-uniformity in the application of customs
duties." (footnote omitted)).
166 Id. (discussing the "coherence of a statutory scheme" as one benefit of having a
specialized court such as the Federal Circuit); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.6 (1989)
(noting variation in outcome of patent litigation by choice of forum prior to establishment of
Federal Circuit).
167 Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 745, 747 (1981)
(arguing that complex areas of the law may "strain the capacity to understand of even the
wisest judge" in a generalist court). But see Jessica M. Bungard, The Fine Line Between
Security and Liberty: The "Secret" Court Struggle to Determine the Path of Foreign
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complicated areas of the law, such as tax, or where interdisciplinary skills are
necessary, such as patent cases, a specialized court may be preferable to
burdening general courts with certain cases that would be time-consuming and
might be poorly decided.168
On the other hand, specialized courts have received substantial criticism.
First, specialized courts foster "ghettoization" that can stultify and isolate courts,
litigants, and the development of the law and generate a kind of "tunnel
vision." 69 Critics have faulted the Federal Circuit's patent law jurisprudence for
reflecting these negative traits.17 0 A generalist judge who adjudicates cases
across multiple subject matter areas will hear arguments from a wide range of
legal and social perspectives and may be better able to consider the
consequences of a decision7' and its coherence with developments in related
areas of law.172 Stephen Legomsky has explained that inter-judicial conflicts are
salutary, for "[a]s courts adopt varying approaches to similar problems, new
insights emerge and analyses mature." 73 Relatedly, Judge Richard Posner has
warned that the lower prestige of specialized courts may lead to their staffing by
less qualified judges, which in turn will undermine respect for the opinions of
such courts and prompt parties to pursue litigation strategies that avoid them.174
Second, there has been substantial concern about the risk of capture and bias
in- specialized courts. This problem may manifest in appointment and
Intelligence Surveillance in the Wake of September 11th, 4 Pirr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 2
(2004) (criticizing FISA court as rubber-stamping what appear to be routine applications).
168 Revesz, supra note 165, at 1117 (arguing that specialized courts may be more likely to
produce correct decisions in complex areas of the law).
169 Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts ofAppeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay
on Delegation and Specialization ofthe Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761, 780 (1983)
(discussing whether specialized courts might attract specialized yet less able lawyers).
17 Dreyfuss, supra note 166, at 3 (outlining the arguments against specialized
adjudication, including tunnel vision, increased susceptibility to capture, and vulnerability to
lobbyists).
"' See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5-12 (2005) (arguing that judges should consider real-world consequences of
competing legal interpretations, about which they may learn from party and amicus briefing).
172 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1237-51 (1987).
173 Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review ofAgency Adjudication: A Study
of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297, 1393 (1986); see Richard L. Marcus,
Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J.
677, 690 (1984) ("[D]ivergent interpretations of federal law actually help the Supreme Court
because they fully air issues before the Court is called upon to decide them.").
174 Posner, supra note 169, at 779-80 (positing that specialization may produce
underqualified judges and lawyers due to the monotony of the cases and procedure).
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nomination fights1 75 and in the quality of adjudication. The capture concern is
especially acute where one party appears in all cases before a specialized court
and thereby develops insider knowledge and other repeat-player advantages.
When the court is fixed in one location, proximate to the repeat player, the
burden on non-repeat litigants and the risk of capture may be even larger.176
Third, critics warn that on appeal, generalist courts may defer to specialized
courts, for reasons of complexity and efficiency, leaving the decisions of the
specialty courts substantially unreviewed. This dynamic, in turn, can exacerbate
the ghettoization effects, frustrate dialogue among courts and judges, and
deprive a legal field of the innovation that would ordinarily arise from disparate
rulings and approaches to a common set of legal questions.177
Finally, specialized courts have frequently confronted challenges to their
public legitimacy, whether as a function of diminished prestige or suspicion
about capture and bias.178 This may frustrate the ability of the court's
administrators to secure adequate resources, attract talented judges and staff, and
to sustain the public respect on which all courts depend.179 Forty years ago, a
major analysis discouraged creation of specialized courts because they tend:
[T]o develop tunnel vision; impose judges' personal views of policy;
reduce incentive for thorough and persuasive opinions; dilute or eliminate
regional influence; reduce the number of opinions by generalist judges;
possibly dilute the quality of appointments; and be captured by special
interest groups.180
A generation later, the Judicial Conference of the United States accepted that
there may be narrow circumstances in which a specialized court is warranted,
but refused to endorse the establishment of new Article III specialized courts,
17 Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329,
331-32 (1991) (noting public choice problem intensifies when lobbying by interest groups on
obscure appointments distorts judicial selection).
176 Id. (noting that repeat litigants "possess natural advantages over occasional
participants").
177 Revesz, supra note 165, at 1157-58.
171 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS,
AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 16, 28 (1990) (discussing the possibility
of "clannishness" that may arise from having a specialized, closed group of attorneys and
judges).
179 Cf Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J.
1999, 2006-09 (2011) (explaining how enforcement of even celebrated decisions like Brown
v. Board ofEducation and Cooper v. Aaron depends on their public acceptance).
1s0 Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545, 550
(1997).
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concluding that "in most instances the well-known dangers of judicial
specialization outweigh any such benefits."'8'
The current structure for judicial review of veterans benefits claims confirms
many of the criticisms of specialized courts. The four-level system of review,
with the CAVC unable to make factual determinations and the Federal Circuit
unable to review them, is cumbersome and contributes to the "hamster wheel"
of churning cases.182 The CAVC is isolated, often disrespected,18 3 and barred
from hearing cases outside the veterans benefits realm that would expose its
judges to developments in procedural due process, administrative law, disability
law, public benefits and employment law, and other related fields. The Secretary
of Veterans Affairs is a party in every case before the CAVC, highlighting the
risk of capture and bias. And VA benefits cases may be complicated, but they
are no more complex than many other kinds of cases routinely heard in non-
specialized courts, including the other classes of federal agency mass-
adjudications-Social Security appeals (which are heard in district courts) and
imnimigration cases (which proceed directly to the regional courts of appeals).
Nor do VA benefits cases require the application of scientific or medical
training, such as justified channeling patent appeals to the Federal Circuitl 84 -
in fact, few CAVC judges have had such specialized training.'18 In any event,
district courts succeed in adjudicating Social Security appeals, which are quite
similar to VA disability compensation claims, the large majority of CAVC
cases. 186
To suggest that the CAVC confirms the problems of specialized courts is not
to denigrate the value of judicial review of VA benefits claims. Judicial review
181 Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 166
F.R.D. 49, 103 (1995). There is no consensus as to whether the Federal Circuit's exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in patent cases has reaped the benefits of specialization while avoiding
its pitfalls. Compare LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform
Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L.
& TECH. 1, with Littman, supra note 180, at 552-53.
182 O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 238.
183 See Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 394 (discussing instances where Article III courts,
the VA, and Congress have ignored or disrespected the CAVC and its decisions).
184 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J.
1437, 1445-53 (2012) (discussing patent specialization in the federal courts).
185 See About the Court: Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS' CLAIMS,
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/judges.php [https://perma.cc/KTV9-FUMK] (last visited Sept.
14, 2017) (listing biographies of CAVC judges).
1I See James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis ofAppellate
Review by the United States Court ofAppeals for Veterans Claims, I VETERANS L. REv. 113,
115-16, 116 n.12 (2009) (reporting that disability compensation claims "represent over 95%
of the claims that are appealed to the BVA").
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appears to have improved the quality of agency decisionmaking87 and fostered
greater transparency and consistency in the VA system.88 The CAVC has
established the field of VA benefits law and resolved many foundational legal
questions.189 Indeed, it has survived far longer than one of the earliest
experiments with a specialized court, the Commerce Court, formed in 1910 to
review decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission and abolished three
years later.'
Yet the four-tiered system of review may have exacerbated the backlog of
claims.191 Frustrated litigants seek to press their claims outside of the CAVC-
Federal Circuit system of review,192 as predicted by Judge Posner.193 Moreover,
the CAVC has not received widespread respect for its decisions, and signs of
agency capture and bias exist.194 Wounded veterans deserve better, and better
models for judicial review are available.
James T. O'Reilly makes a persuasive argument for the merger of VA benefits
cases with Social Security appeals, into the more highly-regarded and better-
functioning Social Security system of regionalized ALJs. Michael P. Allen and
Ridgway, Stichman & Riley offer a host of less radical reforms that might well
reduce the delays and improve the quality of VA adjudications. Current agency
and legislative proposals focus on streamlining administrative appeals,
especially by prohibiting the veteran from supplementing the record on
appeal.195 But there is another available model, whose utility in this field has not
been acknowledged: immigration appeals.
187 See Ridgway, supra note 145, at 265-71 (detailing how after the passage of the VJRA,
grant rates by VAROs rose, grant/remand rates by the BVA rose, and disability ratings also
increased).
'1 See Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 375-76 (discussing the improvements in fairness
and process for veterans under the current system); O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 227-29.
189 See, e.g., Copeland v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 86, 89 (2012) (holding that the CAVC
may invalidate a statutory provision if it is inconsistent with the Constitution); Padgett v.
Peake, 22 Vet. App. 159, 162 (2008) (adopting Article ll case or controversy requirements
of standing).
190 Dreyfuss, supra note 166, at 3 n.17.
' See O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 225-27.
192 See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki (Veterans for Common Sense ll), 678 F.3d
1013, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding court lacks jurisdiction over claim that "the
VA's system for adjudicating veterans' eligibility for disability benefits suffers from
unconscionable delays"); Cooper-Harris v. United States, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1141 (C.D.
Cal. 2013) (invalidating a VA statute barring additional compensation to same-sex spouses as
unconstitutional).
193 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
19 See O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 246.
195 See Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2017: Presentation before the H. Comm. on
Veterans' Affairs, 114th Cong. 19-22 (2016) (statement of the Hon. Robert A. McDonald,
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In addition to Social Security and veterans benefit cases, the third great
system of federal mass-adjudications is the immigration system, which annually
adjudicates hundreds of thousands of deportation cases (relabeled "removal"
cases in 1996).196 Like VA benefits cases, removal cases begin with a localized
fact-finder, an immigration judge who sits in one of sixty immigration courts
around the country. The parties develop the record and the immigration judge
decides whether to order removal or grant relief. Removal cases are adversarial,
with the government represented before the immigration court by a corps of
experienced prosecutors, so they differ in this respect from VA benefits and
Social Security cases. 197 But immigration courts are similar to VAROs and SSA
ALJs in that the administrative record is developed locally, subject to flexible
evidentiary rules,9 8 and offers an opportunity for in-person appearances. There
is also an administrative appeal in removal cases to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (the "BIA") within the Department of Justice.199 Like the BVA, the BIA
often decides cases in single-judge panelS2oo and in opinions that are not binding
on other judges or the board as a whole. The BIA does not sit locally but decides
cases at its offices in Virginia.
The path for immigration appeals diverges from that of SSA and VA cases
when it proceeds to judicial review. An immigrant may appeal an adverse BIA
decision to the court of appeals,201 on a petition for review and subject to familiar
administrative law procedures that are only modestly adapted to the immigration
context.202 Thus, immigration appeals avoid the problems of specialized courts
and the four-layer review of both VA and SSA cases. Immigration appeals
capture the benefits of review by generalized Article III courts, without the
inefficiency and delay of an extra level of review in the CAVC or district courts.
The centralizing role of the BIA reclaims some of the uniformity that is lost by
Secretary of Veterans Affairs) (describing the VA's proposed "Simplified Appeals
Initiative").
196 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
197 But see Allen, supra note 62, at 526-28 (noting that VA system is increasingly
adversarial, even if deemed otherwise by courts and Congress).
198 See, e.g., Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that
administrative proceedings are not bound by strict rules of evidence and thus federal hearsay
rules did not apply); Matter of Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (B.I.A. 1984) (holding that
the rules of evidence do not apply in immigration court).
19 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2016).
200 Id. § 1003.1(e) (assigning many cases to single Board member for disposition).
201 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012).
202 Id. Immigration appeals are generally subject to the Hobbs Act (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2012)) and APA-type review, modified in part by the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537.
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review in the courts of appeal, while permitting vital inter-circuit debate and
development of the law.
One might object that, unlike immigration cases, VA benefits cases are too
numerous to require a unique system of review, but this is not entirely accurate.
There are more VA cases at the VARO level (more than one million annual
filings in recent years) than there are new removal cases filed in the immigration
courts (approximately three hundred thousand immigration court cases filed
annually since fiscal year 2011).203 But the appeal rate in immigration cases is
far higher, yielding comparable numbers at the administrative appeal level
(40,000-50,000 BVA annual appeals, as compared to approximately 30,000 BIA
appeals), and larger numbers in the federal courts (3000-4500 CAVC annual
appeals and about 100 appeals to the Federal Circuit, as compared to
approximately 6000 immigration petitions for review to the courts of appeals).204
In other words, the number of administrative appeals is roughly comparable in
VA benefits and immigration cases, and, in fact, more immigrants than veterans
seek judicial review each year. Thus, volume alone is not a ground to distinguish
administrative or judicial review of immigration and VA benefits cases.
Separately, one might contend that VA benefits involve a lengthy and
confusing statutory scheme, implemented through hundreds of pages of
regulations and sub-regulatory agency guidelines, and often turning on
assessment of conflicting medical information. Yet these features do not
distinguish VA cases from Social Security cases, which proceed through
localized administrative review directly into an Article III court on appeal.
Immigration cases also arise under a complicated statute, implemented through
a morass of regulations, and frequently turn on challenging factual disputes
about social or political conditions in a foreign country, which federal judges
may struggle to assess. Yet it cannot be seriously argued that Article III judges
lack the capacity to adjudicate VA benefits cases because they are of a greater
complexity than immigration or Social Security cases, let alone the array of
difficult criminal, commercial, and other suits on their docket.
Eliminating the CAVC and channeling BVA appeals to the courts of appeals
would achieve many of the benefits of de-specialization. It would enhance the
legitimacy of VA decisions and help integrate VA cases within the mainstream
of U.S. legal developments in due process, administrative law, and disability
law. It would ease the burden on veterans or their counsel of traveling to
Washington, D.C., to be heard before the CAVC. It would also reduce the risk
of capture and bias. Nevertheless, it would not appreciably add to the dockets of
203 ExEc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW OF U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2015 STATISTICS
YEARBOOK A2, Q2 (2016).
204 See U.S. Courts of Appeals-Judicial Business 2015, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2015
[https://perma.cc/LJX7-W7NK] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (stating that 5927 out of 7141
agency appeals, or 83%, were from the BIA).
2017] 1739
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the courts of appeals. About half of the cases filed with the CAVC are resolved
through the court's mediation program,205 a process capable of incorporation
into the existing mediation programs of the regional courts of appeals.
206 Most
importantly, it might reduce the churning of veterans benefits appeals, especially
if the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in VA benefits cases were
commensurate with the ordinary review of agency adjudications, such that the
courts of appeals would more often reach the merits of an appeal.
207
A recent episode in the history of specialized courts confirms many of these
points. In 1999 and 2002, the BIA implemented reforms to address the backlog
of immigration appeals. These reforms involved permitting adjudication by
single-judge panels, rather than the traditional three-judge panels by which the
BIA had previously acted, and also expanded use of summary affirmances.
208
Predictably, these reforms led to a radical decline in the quality of BIA decision-
making,209 and prompted an enormous growth in the number of petitions for
review in the U.S. courts of appeals.210 Concerned that immigration appeals were
swamping the dockets of the regional courts of appeal, in late 2005, Arlen
Specter, then chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, proposed to redirect all
immigration appeals to the Federal Circuit.211 Of course, the Chief Judge of the
Federal Circuit expressed concern,212 but more surprisingly, and despite the
205 See ANNUAL REPORT FY2013, supra note 92, at 1; Jennifer A. Dowd, A PeekInside ...
CAVC's Central Legal Staff VETERANS L.J., Summer 2013, at 8 ("Since 2008 ... the
[telephone conference and mediation] program has resulted in over 50% of represented cases
being disposed of without resorting to judicial resources.").
206 See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Mediation (CAMP): A Message from the ChiefJudge,
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/
staff attorneys/mediation.html [https://perma.cc/LNC9-5TFJ] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
207 See Allen, supra note 62, at 490 (noting that the Federal Circuit may not review factual
determinations, even for clear error or substantial evidence).
208 See Aaron Holland, Developments in the Judicial Branch: New BIA Rules Lead to
Skyrocketing Rate of Appeal, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 615, 615-16 (2005); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 369, 375 (2006).
20 See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005) (criticizing the
poor quality of BIA decisions and observing that the Seventh Circuit has reversed
approximately 40% of cases in recent years).
210 Immigration appeals rose from 3% of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases in 2001 to 15% by
2003, and in the Second and Ninth Circuits, to more than 30% of all appeals. Stanley Mailman
& Stephen Yale-Loehr, Immigration Appeals Overwhelm Federal Courts, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 27,
2004), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=900005420783/Immigration-Law?slreturn-
20170513230235 [https://perma.cc/324J-YP32].
211 See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ACTIVITIES REPORT, S. REP. No. 109-369, at 29-31
(2006).
212 See Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,




temptation to reduce their own workload, leading appellate judges such as Judge
Posner also opposed the change.213 The proposal to channel immigration cases
to a specialized court received a public hearing, but did not advance.214
In short, judicial review has had a beneficial impact on the quality and
transparency of adjudications.215 But the convoluted structure enacted by
Congress does not serve veterans. Channeling review to the CAVC and Federal
Circuit, twin specialized courts that entrench an unsalutary veterans'
exceptionalism, delays claims adjudication and ill serves disabled veterans.
B. Treatment ofMilitary Sexual Assault Claims
Rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment are grave problems in the military
and one of the most urgent civil rights struggles among veterans. Recent media
213 Id. at 168 (statement of Richard Posner, Circuit J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit); see Rachel L. Swarns, In Bills' Small Print, Critics See a Threat to
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2006, at All (discussing Posner's opposition to the bill
because the Federal Circuit judges would be "overwhelmed" by the higher caseload).
214 My students and I submitted written testimony in opposition to this proposal.
Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 212, at 115-31 (statement of Doris Meissner,
Muzaffar A. Chishti & Michael J. Wishnie, Migration Policy Institute). Of other sources cited
in this article, students working under my supervision have litigated the following cases: Serv.
Women's Action Network v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 815 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); The
Few, the Proud, the Forgotten v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. 3:16-cv-00647, 2017
WL 2312354 (D. Conn. May 26, 2017); Bradley v. Stackley, No. 3:17-cv-00495 (D. Conn.
filed Mar. 27, 2017); Kennedy v. Fanning, No. 3:16-cv-02010 (D. Conn. filed Dec. 8, 2016);
Spires v. James, No. 3:16-cv-01905 (D. Conn. ordered Jan. 20, 2017); Dolphin v. McHugh,
No. 3:12-cv-01578 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2014); Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14-cv-00260 (D. Conn.
Nov. 18, 2014); Cowles v. McHugh, No. 3:13-cv-01741, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138927 (D. Conn.
Sept. 30, 2014); Shepherd v. McHugh, No. 3:11-cv-00641 (D. Conn. dismissed Nov. 7, 2013);
Viet. Veterans of Am. Conn. Greater Hartford Chapter 120 v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 8 F.
Supp. 3d 188 (D. Conn. 2014); Viet. Veterans of Am. Conn. Greater Hartford Chapter 120 v.
U.S. Dep't of Def., 10 F. Supp. 3d 245 (D. Conn. 2014); Serv. Women's Action Network v.
Dep't of Def. (SWAN II), 888 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D. Conn. 2012); Serv. Women's Action
Network v. Dep't of Def. (SWAN 1), 888 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Conn. 2012); and Monk v.
Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Students under my supervision have also authored
the following petition, reports, and manual: Ader et al., supra note 110; Boghossian et al.,
supra note 110; Conn. Veterans Legal Ctr., supra note 105; Sidibe & Unger, infra note 370;
Serv. Women's Action Network & ACLU, infra note 220; and Serv. Women's Action
Network & Viet. Veterans of Am., infra note 262.
215 See Allen, Twenty, supra note 6, at 375-76 (discussing fairness and due process
provided by the VA); Ridgway, supra note 145, at 265-71 (discussing changes in efficiency
and accuracy since the passage of the VJRA); cf Bagley, supra note 145, at 1320 (questioning
values served by presumption ofjudicial review of agency actions).
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scrutiny,2 16 lawsuits,217 congressional hearings,218 and direct action219 have
focused public attention on this long-standing feature of military service. Violent
sexual attacks by one service member against another "threaten the strength,
readiness, and morale of the military, undermine national security, and have
devastating personal effects on survivors and their families."220 Here too,
veterans' exceptionalism undermines the interests of former service members.
Military sexual violence is pervasive. One study estimated that one in three
service women is raped during military service,221 and another found that 43%
of women in the military suffered either a rape or an attempted rape.222 Of
veterans who seek VA health care, one in four women and one in a hundred men
216 See, e.g., Ed O'Keefe, Could Congress Have Changed the Outcome of Two High
Profile Cases ofMilitary SexualAssault? Maybe, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Mar. 24,2014, 11:12
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/24/could-congress-have-
changed-the-outcome-of-two-high-profile-cases-of-military-sexual-assault-
maybe/?utm term=.61074332355d [https://perma.cc/85P3-2PFB] (discussing changes to
how the military handles sexual assault cases); Jennifer Steinhauer, Reports ofMilitary Sexual
Assault Rise Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at A24 (reporting on the rapid increase of
sexual assault in the military).
217 See Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (dismissing tort suit by survivors of
military sexual violence); Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); Serv.
Women's Action Network v. Dep't of Def. (SWANI), 888 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Conn. 2012)
(denying in substantial part government motion for summary judgment in Freedom of
Information Act litigation for MST records); Complaint at 1, Bradley v. Stackley, No. 3:17-
cv-00495 (D. Conn. filed Mar. 27, 2017), ECF No. 1 (alleging retaliation against a Navy
veteran who reported sexual harassment).
218 See, e.g., The Relationships Between Military Sexual Assault, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder and Suicide, and on Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Treatment and Management of Victims ofSexual Trauma: Hearing Before Subcomm.
on Pers. ofthe S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 113th Cong. (2014).
219 See, e.g., Greg Jacob, Telling the Truth and Demanding Justice, HUFFINGTON POST:
THE BLOG (May 5, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-jacob/telling-the-
truth-and-demanding-justice b 1498680.html [https://perma.cc/2JTY-FJ3V] (reporting on
the Truth and Justice Summit); TRUTH & JUST. SUMMIT, http://truthandjusticesummit.org/
[https://perma.cc/V57C-4LTV] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (describing a meeting that
provides MST survivors and their families with "the opportunity to share their experiences
with congress members, policy experts and one another").
220 SERV. WOMEN'S ACTION NETWORK & ACLU, BATTLE FOR BENEFITS: VA
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SURVIVORS OF MLITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA 1 (2013) [hereinafter
BATILE FOR BENEFITS].
221 Anne G. Sadler et al., Factors Associated with Women's Risk of Rape in the Military
Environment, 43 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 262, 266 (2003), as amended by 44 AM. J. INDUS. MED.
110 (2003).
222 Alan Fontana & Robert Rosenheck, Focus on Women: Duty-Related and Sexual Stress
in the Etiology of PTSD Among Women Veterans Who Seek Treatment, 49 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 658, 658 (1998).
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self-report an experience of military sexual trauma.223 Of all veterans, more than
half a million have survived MST.224 And many suffer repeated attacks-37%
of female veterans who were raped in service reported at least two rapes, and
14% reported a gang rape.225 MST is vastly under-reported, but the United States
Department of Defense (the "DoD") estimates that there were approximately
20,300 sexual assaults in service during fiscal year 2014.226
Military sexual violence is also highly gendered. The number of total MST
victims is approximately equally balanced between men and women,227 but
because men vastly outnumber women in service,228 this reflects a
disproportionate number of sexual attacks against women. Female service
members who experience MST are at a higher risk of developing a mental health
condition than veterans overall, and are more likely to do so than men who
experience MST.229
Sexual violence in the military is often especially devastating. Survivors
stationed abroad or on bases far from home are isolated from family and friends
who, in a civilian setting, may provide critical support and aid. In addition, many
survivors experience an attack as multiple betrayals, in light of the military's
stated concern for command hierarchy and unit cohesion, and they are
discouraged from filing formal reports for fear of professional and personal
223 U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA 1 (2015),
http://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/mst-general-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RJA-
2D3V].
224 Invisible Wounds: Examining the Disability Compensation Benefits Process for Victims
ofMilitary Sexual Trauma: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem'1
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 112th Cong. 44 (2012) (statement of Hon. Jon
Runyan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem'l Affairs).
225 Sadler et al., supra note 221, at 266.
226 RAND CORP., SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY:
VOLUME 2. ESTIMATES FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SERVICE MEMBERS FROM THE 2014
RAND MILITARY WORKPLACE STUDY 9 (Andrew R. Morral, Kristie L. Gore & Terry L. Schell
eds., 2015) ("Our best estimate in this range is that 20,300 active-component service members
were sexually assaulted in the past year, out of 1,317,561 active-component members."
(footnote omitted)).
227 Id. ("The estimated rate of sexual assault varied significantly by gender: fewer than 1
in 100 men but approximately 1 in 20 women, resulting in an estimated 10,600 servicemen
and 9,600 servicewomen who experienced a sexual assault in the past year.").
228 Approximately 10% of veterans are women. U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FACT
SHEET: WOMEN VETERANS POPULATION (2016), http://www.va.gov/womenvet/docs/
WomenVeteransPopulationFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWC5-YX4Z].
229 U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, VA Screenings Yield Data on Military Sexual Trauma,
VA RES. CURRENTS, Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 5, http://www.research.va.gov/resources/pubs/docs/
va-researchcurrentsnov-dec_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW4L-6QPT].
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retaliation.230 Rape is the trauma "most highly correlated" with development of
PTSD.231
In response, survivors of military sexual violence have led one of the most
important veterans' mobilizations of recent years. Individual veterans and new
organizations have demanded reforms to the military justice systems
232 and to
the VA process of adjudicating MST-based claims.233 The campaign by former
service members for recognition by VA of their in-service injuries presents the
second set of emerging civil rights concerns for veterans today.2
34
While some of the public debate has centered on efforts to ensure more vigorous
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of service members who commit sexual
violence, the recent scrutiny of MST poses a set of challenges for the VA as well.
235
VA data disclosed in settlements of Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
litigation236 reveals multiple forms of discrimination in benefits claims premised on
230 Alina Suris et al., Mental Health, Quality of Life, and Health Functioning in Women
Veterans: Diferential Outcomes Associated with Military and Civilian Sexual Assault, 22 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 179, 193 (2007) (explaining that "the unit cohesion that usually
provides a protective barrier in the military setting may not be available to a woman who has
been assaulted by another member of the unit"); see also HRW, Booted, supra note 107
(discussing the ramifications of sexual assault in the military).
231 Deborah Yaeger et al., DSM-IV Diagnosed Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Women
Veterans With and Without Military Sexual Trauma, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S65, S65
(2006).
232 See, e.g., Anu Bhagwati & John Rowan, Letter to the Editor, Sexual Abuse in the
Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2013, at A32.
233 The VA defines MST as "psychological trauma, which ... resulted from a physical
assault of a sexual nature, battery of a sexual nature, or sexual harassment which occurred
while the veteran was serving on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive duty
training." 38 U.S.C. § 1720D(a)(1) (Supp. II 2015).
234 There has been almost no attention paid to these issues in legal scholarship. But see
Kaylee R. Gum, Military Sexual Trauma and Department of Veterans Affairs Disability
Compensation for PTSD: Barriers, Evidentiary Burdens and Potential Remedies, 22 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 689, 689-90 (2016) ("Reforms to reporting and disciplinary procedures
in the military could increase the number of individuals who choose to report MST incidents,
and make it easier for survivors to obtain benefits for PTSD and other mental disabilities
associated with MST."); Brianne Ogilvie & Emily Tamlyn, Coming Full Circle: How VBA
Can Complement Recent Changes in DoD and VHA Policy Regarding Military Sexual
Trauma, 4 VETERANS L. REv. 1, 1 (2012) (discussing the "unique 'double traumas' of war
and sexual assault" that can lead to PTSD in female veterans).
235 Ogilvie & Tamlyn, supra note 234, at 2 ("[V]eterans applying compensation benefits
for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) based on military sexual trauma (MST) have and
will continue to confront a looming evidentiary problem when establishing their stressors."
(footnotes omitted)).
236 Serv. Women's Action Network v. Dep't of Def. (SWAN 1l), 888 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D.
Conn. 2012); Serv. Women's Action Network v. Dep't of Def. (SWAN 1), 888 F. Supp. 2d
231 (D. Conn. 2012).
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MST. First, the VA denies PTSD claims in which the veteran alleges that the stressor
was military sexual violence at a far greater rate than it denies PTSD claims in which
the veteran alleges any other stressor.237 In each year from 2008 to 2012, the VA
grant rate for MST-related PTSD claims was 16.5 to 29.6 percentage points lower
than the non-MST-related PTSD grant rate.238 Because the PTSD claims of women
veterans are much more likely to be attributable to MST than the PTSD claims of
male veterans, the low grant rates for MST-related PTSD claims disproportionately
impact women.239
Second, within the population of MST-related PTSD claims, the VA is far
more likely to grant benefits for female veterans than for male veterans. From
2008 to 2012, there was a substantial gap between male and female veterans in
the grant rate for MST-related PTSD claims,240 and there was also a significantly
lower grant rate for male veterans seeking benefits for MST-related PTSD than
for PTSD based on other stressors.24 1 In other words, while the VA's reluctance
to grant benefits to veterans seeking help for MST-related PTSD has a disparate
impact on female veterans within the population of sexual violence survivors,
the VA also appears to discriminate against male veterans by denying their
claims at a higher rate than it denies those submitted by women.
Third, VA treatment of MST-related PTSD claims varies wildly according to
which local office is making the determination. In 2012, of the VAROs that
decided forty or more MST-related PTSD claims, the treatment rate ranged from
237 BATTLE FOR BENEFITS, supra note 220, at 1.
238 Id. at 5 fig.1; see Editorial, Justicefor Women Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at
A26 (noting the significant gap in grant rates for MST-related PTSD claims and all other
PTSD claims, based on SWAN FOIA data). This gap does not appear when considering MST-
related claims for major depressive or anxiety disorders, the next most likely diagnoses for a
sexual violence survivor with a mental health disorder. BATTLE FOR BENEFITS, supra note 220,
at 5-6 figs.2 & 4. MST-related claims for these diagnoses are far less numerous. Id. at 4.
239 BATTLE FOR BENEFITS, supra note 220, at 4 (showing that for 2008-2012, female
veterans submitted 66.1% of MST-related PTSD claims but only 4.6% of all PTSD claims);
id. at 8 (showing that for 2008-2012, MST-based claims represented 19.2 to 39.9% of all
PTSD claims submitted by female veterans). In response to the release of BATTLE FOR
BENEFITS, the VA made public data on MST-related claims for fiscal year 2013 alleging a
narrowing gap between MST-related PTSD claims and other PTSD claims. See VETERANS
BENEFITS ADMIN., FACT SHEET: PTSD DUE TO MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA (MST) (2013).
This was the very same class of data the VA had fought for years in litigation to withhold
from the public. See SWANII, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83 (requesting records related to sexual
assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence within the military under FOIA); SWANI,
888 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38 (seeking release of records from the DoD).
24 BATTLE FOR BENEFITS, supra note 220, at 7-8 figs.5 & 6.
241 Id. at 7 fig.5 (demonstrating that the grant rates for MST-related PTSD claims were on
average 29.6 percentage points lower than the grant rates for other PTSD claims between
fiscal years 2008 and 2012).
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87.5% (Los Angeles) to 25.8% (St. Paul).24 2 There were also broad discrepancies
within some VAROs in their treatment of MST-related PTSD claims and all
other PTSD claims.243 This geographic distribution suggests that more important
than the evidence marshaled by a veteran seeking PTSD based on sexual
violence may be the happenstance of where that veteran resides.
The VA has responded to these discrepancies by revamping its training
programs and its internal management of MST claims.
244 These internal agency
measures have failed to eliminate the disparate treatment of MST-related PTSD
claims, however,245 and the plain language of the VA regulations continues to
discriminate in the evidentiary burden imposed on veterans with MST caused
PTSD and veterans disabled by PTSD arising from other stressors.246 As a result,
it remains the case that veterans who survive military sexual violence confront
significant barriers to accessing VA benefits. There is also substantial evidence
of arbitrariness in outcomes based on geography.
247 Overall, the VA's
mistreatment of sexual assault survivors raises legal issues that are likely to
engage the agency, advocates, and courts in the coming years, and pressure the
continuing veterans' law exceptionalism.
The first issue concerns gender discrimination. As noted, the VA's low grant
rate for MST-related PTSD has a disparate impact on female veterans, and
within the population of MST claimants, also reflects discrimination against
male veterans. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, and national origin in federal programs, but not based on
242 Id. at app. at A-12 to A-15.
243 Id. at 9-11 (listing VAROs that had the lowest grant rates for MST-related PTSD
disability benefits).
244 Serv. Women's Action Network v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 815 F.3d 1369, 1375-76
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (observing that VA retraining programs and designation of MST specialist
in VAROs have narrowed disparity in approval rates of MST-related PTSD claims and all
PTSD claims).
245 Id. (noting a grant rate of 49% of MST-based PTSD claims as opposed to 55% for all
PTSD claims); see id. at 1379 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (concluding that the VA's improved
training and outreach do not justify or remedy the different evidentiary standards required to
receive benefits for MST-based PTSD and other forms of PTSD).
246 See id. at 1379 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Secretary failed to provide
a reasoned explanation for "maintenance of diferent evidentiary standards for PTSD claims
resulting from MST, and PTSD claims resulting from other stressors"). Compare 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.304(f)(1)-(4) (2016) (stating that veteran's lay testimony is sufficient to establish
occurrence of in-service stressor for PTSD based on combat and in other specified
circumstances), with id. § 3.304(f)(5) (stating that veteran's lay testimony is not sufficient to
establish occurrence of in-service stressor for PTSD based on "personal assault," which
includes MST).
247 See BATTLE FOR BENEFITS, supra note 220, at 12 ("At many offices,... the grant rates
have risen and fallen according to no discernible patterns over the five years in the dataset.").
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sex or gender,248 and there is no other general statutory bar on sex discrimination
in federal programs.249 Nor is there any regulation or executive order that
independently prohibits discrimination based on sex in federal programs,250 nor
one specific to the VA. Nevertheless, the disparate treatment of female veterans
suffering from PTSD, and the discrimination between male and female veterans
who seek disability compensation based on sexual violence, cannot be squared
with the Constitution's commitment to equal treatment under law.251 In a recent
rulemaking challenge to the VA's adjudication of MST claims, the Federal
Circuit rejected a constitutional sex discrimination claim for lack of evidence of
intentional discrimination.252 The court's decision, and the Secretary's refusal to
engage in a rulemaking, may channel legal challenges by MST survivors to the
CAVC 253 or to a constitutional challenge in the district court.254
Second, the longstanding refusal of the VA to recognize MST-related PTSD
claims may reflect a form of disability discrimination-discrimination against
the sub-class of veterans suffering PTSD whose injury is attributable to military
sexual violence. Historically, the VA has been skeptical of, and even hostile to,
PTSD as a medical diagnosis, and for years rejected disability benefits claims
on this basis.255 Some of this attitude, no doubt, reflected the antagonism toward
248 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
249 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on sex in
employment. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Title IX bars discrimination based on sex in educational
programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). Neither of these statutes, however, reaches general
federal programs such as VA benefits.
250 See Exec. Order No. 12731 § 101(m), 55 Fed. Reg. 42547, 42548 (Oct. 19, 1990)
(requiring federal employees to comply with existing anti-discrimination statutes, including
those prohibiting sex discrimination), reprinted as amended in 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (2016).
251 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (holding discrimination based
on sex in state military academy subject to heightened scrutiny under equal protection
principles). But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring proof of
discriminatory intent as element of equal protection claim).
252 Serv. Women's Action Network v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 815 F.3d 1369, 1377-78
(finding evidence insufficient to establish the Secretary had a discriminatory motive when
denying the petition).
253 The lack of discovery in veterans benefits cases may complicate litigation of a sex
discrimination claim before the CAVC. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki
(Veterans for Common Sense ll), 678 F.3d 1013, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding
that procedural due process does not require "the general right of discovery, including the
power to subpoena witnesses and documents [or] the ability to examine and cross-examine
witnesses").
254 See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974) (holding that statutory preclusion
of judicial review of veteran benefits claims cannot bar constitutional challenges); Veterans
for Common Sense II, 678 F.3d at 1033-35 (concluding that the district court has jurisdiction
over due process challenge to VARO procedures).
255 Ridgway, supra note 31, at 197-200.
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the claims and needs of the Vietnam generation, who had to struggle mightily to
establish that the signature injuries of the Vietnam War-Agent Orange illnesses
and PTSD-were "real" wounds.25 6 Even though the VA now formally accepts
PTSD as a legitimate mental health disorder, some VA adjudicators retain a
residue of this hostility.
The origins of VA antagonism to PTSD aside, unlike sex discrimination, there
is a broad statutory prohibition on disability discrimination in federal programs,
pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
257 Litigation under the
Rehabilitation Act may test the lawfulness of VA discrimination against a sub-
class of veterans with PTSD, and, while such a suit would face some doctrinal
obstacles,258 these are not insurmountable. The equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause also prohibits federal discrimination
based on disability.259 Thus, the VA is likely to be called upon to justify its
disparate treatment of MST-related PTSD claimants, both in practice and on the
face of its regulations, in light of statutory and constitutional prohibitions on
disability discrimination.
Third, veterans and their advocates have mobilized to seek specific VA
procedural reforms to redress the disparate treatment of MST claimants relative
to other former service members suffering from PTSD. In congressional
hearings,260 proposed legislation,261 and a formal rulemaking petition submitted
to the VA in 2013,262 advocates have sought to revise the evidentiary standards
and case-handling procedures used by the VA in adjudicating MST-related
256 Id. at 197-212.
257 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) ("No otherwise qualified individuals with a disability ...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . .").
258 For instance, section 504 prohibits only discrimination based "solely" on disability, and
MST-related PTSD is not a disability, as there is no medical diagnosis for this sub-class of
PTSD. Id.
259 E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 1006-07
(2002) (explaining that disability discrimination is "presumptively invalid" under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
260 Legislative Hearing on H.R. 569, H.R. 570, H.R. 602, HR. 671, HR. 679, HR. 733,
H.R. 894 and HR. 1405 Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem'1 Affairs of
the H. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 113th Cong. 69-70 (2013) (statement of National
Organization of Veterans' Advocates).
261 Ruth Moore Act of 2013, H.R. 671, 113th Cong. § 2; Ruth Moore Act of 2013, S. 294,
113th Cong. § 2.
262 SERV. WOMEN'S ACTION NETWORK & VIET. VETERANS OF AM., PETITION FOR
RULEMAKING TO PROMULGATE REGULATIONS GOVERNING SERVICE-CONNECTION FOR MENTAL
HEALTH DISABILITIES FROM MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT 42-58 (2013).
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claims.263 In particular, advocates have pressed for the recognition of a
rebuttable evidentiary presumption in MST-related claims, similar to
presumptions already reflected in VA regulations. These include presumptions
for prisoners-of-war,264 combat-related PTSD claims,265 noncombat PTSD
based on "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity," 266 exposure to Agent
Orange and other herbicides,267 radiation-exposed service members,268 and
service-connection for various illnesses caused by Agent Orange.269 Indeed, in
announcing the promulgation of the new combat-PTSD presumption, President
Obama explained that "many veterans with PTSD who have tried to seek
benefits ... have often found themselves stymied. They've been required to
produce evidence proving that a specific event caused their PTSD ... Well, I
don't think our troops on the battlefield should have to take notes to keep for a
claims application."270 Nor, of course, should rape survivors have to take notes
to keep for a claims application.
The efforts to reform VA adjudications of MST claims raise thorny questions
of evidence and administrative procedure, and challenge the exceptional
treatment of such claims by veterans. Secretary Robert McDonald rejected the
2013 rulemaking petition submitted by the Service Women's Action Network
and Vietnam Veterans of America ("VVA"), and a divided panel of the Federal
Circuit affirmed his decision, emphasizing its "extremely limited and highly
deferential standard of review."271 Like any administrative agency, the VA has
broad discretion to implement its authorizing statutes. The willingness of the
agency to promulgate regulations creating presumptions for some common
forms of PTSD, however, but not for others, may be inconsistent with the
263 See Ogilvie & Tamlyn, supra note 234, at 36-39 (recommending that the VA
"liberalize[] the evidentiary standard" for MST-based PTSD claims). VA regulations permit
veterans to demonstrate that PTSD is related to an in-service assault using corroborating
evidence, but do not establish any presumption of service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5)
(2016).
264 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(e).
265 Id. § 3.304(f)(2).
266 Id. § 3.304(f)(3).
267 Id. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii)-(iv).
268 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2012).
269 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a), 3.309.
270 President Barack Obama, Weekly Address: President Obama Announces Change to
Help Veterans with PTSD Receive the Benefits They Need, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA WHITE
HOUSE (July 10, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/weekly-
address-president-obama-announces-changes-help-veterans-with-ptsd-receive-be
[https://perma.cc/6BMU-69SP].
271 Serv. Women's Action Network v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 815 F.3d 1369, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2016); see id. at 1379-80 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Secretary's
failure to provide a reasoned explanation for treating PTSD claims differently renders the
Secretary's decision arbitrary).
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prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action or irrational
classifications,272 notwithstanding the decision in Service Women's Action
Network v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs.273
A distinct objection to the proposed evidentiary presumption for MST
claimants is that its establishment would likely lead the VA to approve more
claims, pay out more funds, and perhaps permit a degree of fraud.274 But the
resource-based objection is no defense to the argument that regulatory reform is
warranted to remedy sex or disability discrimination.275 Past proposals for VA
evidentiary presumptions have similarly met initial objections that their adoption
would increase fraud.276 Yet in the past, in the face of substantial evidence that
VA procedures resulted in the denial of benefits to a class of disabled veterans,
the agency has established an evidentiary presumption. Vague concerns for
fraud, and temporary programs for the enhanced training of VA adjudicators,
cannot justify the agency's "maintenance of different evidentiary standards for
PTSD claims resulting from MST, and PTSD claims resulting from other
stressors."277 Nor can these concerns justify excepting MST claims from
mainstream constitutional and administrative law commitments to sex equality
and against disability discrimination.
C. Collective Actions and the Backlog
One cannot write about contemporary issues in VA claims adjudication
without examining the most notorious problem vexing the system: its baffling,
enduring, outrageous delays. Agency delay is a classic civil rights and poverty
law issue, but as with the structure of judicial review and treatment of MST
claims, its resolution is undermined by veterans' law exceptionalism. Recent
procedural initiatives, such as the implementation of the "fully developed claim"
272 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
273 815 F.3d at 1369.
274 See Ogilvie & Tamlyn, supra note 234, at 38 ("[P]roposals to expand presumptions
may encourage malingering . ... [And] VBA is not immune to fraudulent claims." (footnote
omitted)).
275 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982) ("[A] concern for the preservation of
resources standing alone can hardly justify the [discriminatory] classification used in
allocating those resources.").
276 See, e.g., Bradley A. Fink, Presume Too Much: An Examination ofHow the Proposed
COMBATPTSD Act Would Alter the Presumption ofa Traumatic Stressor's Occurrence for
Veterans, 2 VETERANS L. REv. 221, 241-42 (2010) ("If the system were changed so that
veterans could establish the occurrence of a claimed stressor through his or her statements
alone, some veterans may fabricate combat experiences to support their [PTSD] claims.").
277 Serv. Women's Action Network, 815 F.3d at 1379 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
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process,278 and congressional appropriation of additional resources for the VA,
has increased the number of decisions made annually by the VAROs, but the
number of claims continues to exceed annual adjudications.279 The agency still
routinely fails to meet its goal of adjudicating new claims within 125 days of
submission, and appeals to the BVA drag on for four years on average.280 With
the high rate of remands by both the BVA and CAVC, 281 the churning of claims
seems endless.282 It is unsurprising that veterans and their advocates have
repeatedly sought o escape these infuriating delays outside the statutory
channels created by Congress.283 Veterans' law exceptionalism has frustrated
these efforts.
Many studies have yielded appalling figures on the VA backlog and delays.
The VA had 376,114 claims pending before it as of April 15, 2017, with 98,127
claims that were at least 125 days old.284 "In the last four years, the number of
claims pending for over a year has grown by over 2000%, despite a 40% increase
in the VA's budget."285 As the Ninth Circuit noted, it "takes approximately 4.4
278 Fully Developed Claims, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/
fdc [https://perma.cc/AD6A-D7CN] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017); see NVLSP MANUAL, supra
note 63, at 895-98.
279 2013 Monday Morning Workload Reports, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/mmwr/2011/index.asp [https://perma.cc/D6N9-
LQHK] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) ("While VA completed a record-breaking 1 million
claims per year in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the number of claims received continues
to exceed the number processed.").
280 See supra notes 77, 84, 86-87 and accompanying text (describing lengthy process of
initial application for benefits).
281 See supra notes 89, 98 and accompanying text (discussing appeal process for benefits
decisions).
282 O'Reilly, supra note 149, at 229 ("Right now, [the veterans benefits decisional process]
is only a carousel consisting of remand, mishandling, rehearing, remand, and so on."). But see
Gary E. O'Connor, Rendering to Caesar: A Response to Professor O'Reilly, 53 ADMIN. L.
REv. 343, 382-84 (2001) (arguing that remand is preferable to denial as it preserves "effective
date" of application and permits veteran, on remand, to fill gaps in evidentiary record).
283 See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki (Veterans for Common Sense ll), 678 F.3d
1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction challenge to
extraordinary delays in VA mental health programs); Jacob B. Natwick, Note, Unreasonable
Delay at the VA: Why Federal District Courts Should Intervene andRemedy Five-Year Delays
in Veterans' Mental-Health Benefits Appeals, 95 IOWA L. REv. 723, 737-44 (2010)
(discussing the courts' failure to remedy the severe delay in veterans benefits decisions).
284 Veterans Benefits Administration Reports: Detailed Claims Data, U.S. DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFF., http://benefits.va.gov/reports/detailed-claims-data.asp [https://perma.cc/
663P-SBW6] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
285 Press Release, John McCain et al., Senators, Letters Urging Obama Administration to
End Backlog of VA Disability Claims (Apr. 29, 2013), available at
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years from the date of the veteran's initial filing of a service-connected death
and disability compensation claim to the final decision" by the BVA, 286
exclusive of further appeals or "any time that may have elapsed between the
Regional Office's initial rating decision and the veteran's filing of his Notice of
Disagreement, which may be up to one year."287 A more recent study found that
an administrative appeal alone can delay adjudication for approximately four-
and-a-half years.288 The VA's frequent misplacement of applications (at a rate
of 10% according to a recent study) further aggravates the problem.289 There is
a high error rate, including what the VA considers "avoidable remands,"290 and
the disability ratings system is also severely flawed.291
Congress has held hearings for years on the VA backlog,292 but no legislation
has been passed that effectively addresses the problem. The VA has tried
streamlining some cases,2 93 shifting cases from overwhelmed VAROs to those
http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=56ede455-a7fc-661e-
736d-6109eleldc59 [https://perma.cc/9PQ9-DVMG].
286 Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki (Veterans for Common Sense 1), 644 F.3d 845,
859 (9th Cir. 2011); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-453T,
VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS: CHALLENGES TO TIMELY PROCESSING PERSIST (2013)
(identifying internal and external factors contributing to growth of benefits final decision
backlog).
287 Veterans for Common Sense I, 644 F.3d at 859.
288 JACQUELINE MAFFUCCI, IRAQ & AFG. VETERANS OF AM., THE BATTLE TO END THE VA
BACKLOG 10 (2014) (citing U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-213, VETERANS'
DISABILITY BENEFITS: FURTHER EVALUATION OF ONGOING INITIATIVES COULD HELP IDENTIFY
EFFECTIVE APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING CLAIMS PROCESSING (2010)) (attributing the length
of the appeals process to the complexity of the system).
289 An Examination of Poorly Performing U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Regional
Offices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem'1 Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 112th Cong. 41 (2011) (statement of Belinda J. Finn, Assistant
Inspector General for Audits and Evaluations, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs).
290 See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense 1, 644 F.3d at 859-60 (summarizing trial
evidence); DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ISSUE 75, SEMIANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 27 (2015-2016).
291 See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-846, VA DISABILITY
COMPENSATION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS HURDLES FACING PROGRAM MODERNIZATION
i (2012) (reporting that the disability ratings system resulted in "lower disability compensation
payment levels for some"); PAMELA VILLARREAL & KYLE BUCKLEY, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS, THE VETERANS DISABILITY SYSTEM: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 3 (2012)
(describing the disability ratings system as out-of-date).
292 See, e.g., An Examination of Poorly Performing US. Department of Veterans Affairs
Regional Offices, supra note 289, at 41 (holding hearings for failure of VAROs to issue final
decisions on veterans benefits claims).
293 Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note 195, at 18 ("VBA successfully
streamlined a complex and paper-bound compensation claims process and implemented
1752 [Vol. 97:1709
VETERANS' LAW EXCEPTIONALISM
less busy, providing supplemental training,294 precluding veterans from
supplementing the evidentiary record on appeal,295 and other strategies.296 Yet
the backlog and the mindless churning remain.
Public benefits lawyers outside the VA system have long struggled to address
systemic delays.297 In the VA benefits area, any such effort has been further
complicated by a unique threshold difficulty: for nearly thirty years, the CAVC
rejected efforts to fashion class-action or other aggregate claim rules, insisting
instead that each veteran litigate his own case, one at a time. In one of the court's
earliest en banc decisions, Harrison v. Derwinski,298 the CAVC held that it
lacked jurisdiction to adopt a class-action rule, which the court worried would
be "unmanageable" and which was, in the court's view, also unnecessary,
because its decisions are binding on the VA. 299 One concurring judge noted that
"under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988), the Court may have the
power to entertain class actions in appropriate situations."3>
In subsequent years, veterans' advocates sought to seize on the invitation to
develop aggregate litigation approaches under the All Writs Act, but the CAVC
resisted. In American Legion v. Nicholson,301 for instance, in a 4-3 decision, the
court held that the American Legion lacks standing to seek mandamus relief
when challenging the BVA Chairman's decision to stay a large class of cases,
including those of many American Legion members.302 The CAVC majority
people, process, and technology initiatives necessary to optimize productivity and
efficiency.").
294 See VILLARREAL & BUCKLEY, supra note 291, at 9 (discussing failure of 2010
comprehensive retraining initiative in VA).
295 See Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note 195, at 19-20.
296 On August 1, 2017, Congress enacted another set of VA reforms intended to reduce the
administrative appeals backlog. See Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act
of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-55, 131 Stat. 1105. The VA estimates it will take eighteen months
to implement the new legislation. Nikki Wentling, Senate Passes VA Appeals Reform Bill,
STARS & STRIPES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.stripes.com/news/us/senate-passes-va-appeals-
reform-bill-1.481029#.WbqtU8h942w [https://perma.cc/9Q43-FMX9].
297 See, e.g., Exley v. Burwell, No. 3:14-cv-01230, 2015 WL 3649632, at *6 (D. Conn.
June 10, 2015) (challenging delays in Medicare appeals); Booth v. McManaman, 830 F. Supp.
2d 1037, 1040 (D. Haw. 2011) (challenging delays in determining food stamp eligibility).
298 1 Vet. App. 438 (1991) (en banc) (per curiam).
29 Id.; see also Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991) (en banc) (per
curiam) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to adopt rule for class actions). Congress
authorized the CAVC to develop its own rules for practice before the court, 38 U.S.C.
§ 7264(a) (2012), but the majority declined to exercise this statutory power to fashion a
collective action rule. But see Ridgway, Stichman & Riley, supra note 146, at 16-18
(explaining that the CAVC rarely issues panel or precedential decisions).
3 Harrison, 1 Vet. App. at 439 (Kramer, J., concurring).
301 21 Vet. App. 1 (2007) (en banc).
302 Id. at 4.
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declined to adopt associational standing rules, reasoning that "because Congress
did not intend for this Court's jurisdiction to expand beyond addressing appeals
filed by individual claimants adversely affected by final Board decisions, we are
not permitted to . . . allow for associational standing."303 Three judges dissented,
arguing the majority had conflated jurisdiction and standing and misread the
court's jurisdictional statutes.304
In 2013, the CAVC rejected another effort to develop aggregate litigation
rules. A VA regulation had expanded the period of service in the Korean
Demilitarized Zone for which exposure to Agent Orange would be presumed,30s
but a dispute arose regarding the effective date for the VA benefits claims of the
veterans who might be aided by this new regulation. When the "effective date"
dispute reached the CAVC, 306 veterans' advocates attempted to preserve the
issue in other pending cases, recognizing that a precedential decision of the
CAVC would not apply to any claims that had become administratively final. 30 7
Accordingly, veterans' advocates representing a second Korean DMZ claimant
sought to intervene in the lead case pending at the CAVC, and, when denied,
sought a writ of mandamus on behalf of the second claimant and others similarly
situated.308 The requested writ would have compelled the VA to identify VA
claimants who might benefit from a future decision on the "effective date" issue,
toll the period for filing appeals for such claimants (so that no such claim would
become administratively final before the CAVC decided the lead case), and
notify other claimants of the lead case and the tolling of their appeal deadlines.
309
The CAVC, in a single-judge ruling, denied the petition on the ground that the
second Korean DMZ claimant lacked standing because he himself could
continue to appeal and thereby preserve the issue.310
Most recently, in 2015, a Vietnam veteran named Conley Monk petitioned
the CAVC for a mandamus to decide his long-pending disability claim and
proposed to represent all other veterans facing extensive delays in adjudication
303 Id.
304 Id. at 10-12 (Hagel, Kasold & Schoelen, JJ., dissenting).
305 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(6)(iv), 3.814(c)(2) (2016).
306 See Mallory v. Shinseki, No. 11-401, 2012 WL 4466676, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 28,
2012), order withdrawn, No. 11-401, 2013 WL 3578118 (Vet. App. July 12, 2013).
307 See Tobler v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 8, 14 (1991) ("[A]ny rulings, interpretations, or
conclusions of law contained in such a decision are authoritative and binding as of the date
the decision is issued .... ).
308 McKinney v. Shinseki, No. 12-3639, 2013 WL 2902799, at *2-3 (Vet. App. June 14,
2013).
309 Id.
310 Id. at *2-4. The court went on to state that even if the second claimant had standing, the
court would deny the application on the merits on the ground that he "has not shown a clear
and indisputable right to the writ ... because he has failed to allege that the Secretary
committed an unlawful act or neglected a mandatory duty." Id. at *4.
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of their administrative appeal.311 Recognizing that the CAVC had previously
refused to promulgate a judicial rule regarding class actions, Monk nevertheless
asked the court to exercise its authority under the All Writs Act or its inherent
judicial powers to aggregate claims of veterans facing prolonged VA delays in
administrative appeals.312 Applying its precedent, the CAVC again concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to aggregate claims.313
Before Monk, veterans' advocates had not appealed the CAVC's repeated
rejection of aggregate litigation strategies to the Federal Circuit. Advocates
instead looked outside the court, seeking to persuade district courts or courts of
appeals to do what the CAVC would not.314 The most substantial recent example
is Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki,315 a proposed class action to redress
delays in the VA provision of mental health care and adjudication of disability
compensation claims.316 Among other things, the plaintiffs initially challenged
"the absence of class action procedures in the [VA's] adjudication of benefits
claims . . ."317 The district court in large part denied the VA's motion to
dismiss, granted limited discovery, conducted a seven-day bench trial, and then
denied all relief to the plaintiffs.318 A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' APA claims but reversed the dismissal of many of the
31" Monk v. McDonald, No. 15-1280, 2015 WL 3407451, at *2 (Vet. App. May 27, 2015),
rev'd, Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
312 Id.
313 Id. at *3. When the VA Secretary requests it, the CAVC has shown a more flexible
approach to aggregate litigation. See Ribaudo v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 137, 137 (2007);
Ribaudo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 552, 552 (2007). In these decisions, the VA sought an
order staying a class of cases so as to avoid paying out benefits while the VA appealed an
adverse ruling to the Federal Circuit. See Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 257 (2006)
(involving extension of presumption of herbicide exposure to sailors who served in waters
offshore of Vietnam). The VA sought the stay order in the case of a single veteran, Ribaudo,
and the CAVC granted the relief, resulting in a stay of thousands of cases. Ribaudo, 21 Vet.
App. at 146-47 (denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the Secretary's stay motion). In this
case, the CAVC recognized that one veteran had standing of a sort to represent the interests
of thousands of other veterans. Id. at 145 ("[Tihe Court must accept its role in balancing
competing interests where it is not always possible to process some veterans' claims without
prejudicing the interests of other veterans.").
314 See, e.g., Natwick, supra note 283, at 746 (urging intervention from courts of general
jurisdiction to remedy the serious delays).
315 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012).
316 Id..at 1015-16.
317 Id. at 1018 n.7. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the challenge to the lack of a class
action procedure at the CAVC was "abandoned ... on appeal." Id.
311 Id. at 1018.
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due process claims.319 On rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit ordered
dismissal of the entire action.320
By contrast, Monk pressed his appeal to the Federal Circuit, contending that
the CAVC has the power to aggregate claims in an appropriate case, pursuant
either to the All Writs Act or the court's inherent powers.321 A law professors'
amicus brief offered a third source for the power to aggregate, namely pursuant
to the court's organic statute.322 Monk and his amici also explained that
aggregate actions, even in unusual circumstances, advance important
management functions, ensure fairness for litigants (especially for those without
the means to retain individual counsel), and foster healthy inter-branch
dialogue.323 Curiously, in its own briefing, the Secretary never explicitly
disagreed that the CAVC possesses the power to aggregate. Instead, the VA
contended that aggregation in Monk's particular case was "not merited."
324
In a significant decision, the Federal Circuit unanimously reversed, holding
that the CAVC has the authority to certify class actions "under the All Writs Act,
other statutory authority, and the Veterans Court's inherent powers."
325 The
court began its analysis by observing that, in his briefing, the Secretary did not
dispute the power of the CAVC to aggregate claims, and further, that, at oral
argument, the Department of Justice had "concede[d]" the point.326 Beginning
with the All Writs Act, Judge Reyna explained that this statute unquestionably
applied to the CAVC and supplied the court with the power to fashion
"procedural instruments designed to achieve the rational ends of law." 327 The
court also observed that in the context of petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,
the Second Circuit had used its All Writs Act authority to develop a rule for
"representative" habeas actions, incorporating many of the substantive
319 Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki (Veterans for Common Sense 1), 644 F.3d 845,
890 (9th Cir. 2011).
320 Veterans for Common Sense II, 678 F.3d at 1037 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction).
321 Opening Brief of Claimant-Appellant, Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(No. 15-7092).
322 Corrected Amicus Brief and Appendix of 15 Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, and
Federal Courts Professors in Support of Appellant and Reversal, Monk, 855 F.3d at 1312
(No. 15-7092).
323 Sant'Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 2000 ("By adopting aggregate
procedures, agencies may produce uniform outcomes more efficiently, provide more fairness
for groups that depend upon the administrative state, and offer institutional advantages over
aggregation in federal court.").
324 Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 29, Monk, 855 F.3d at 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-
7092). The Secretary made additional technical arguments regarding mootness and the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 10-29.
325 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1318.
326 Id.
327 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 97:17091756
VETERANS' LA WEXCEPTIONALISM
requirements of Rule 23, but adapting them to the particulars of the habeas
context.328 The Federal Circuit went on to hold that the CAVC also has the
authority to aggregate claims under its organic statute, as argued by the Law
Professors Amicus, and pursuant to its inherent judicial powers.329 Judge Reyna
was surely correct that aggregation can promote "efficiency, consistency, and
fairness, and improv[e] access to legal and expert assistance by parties with
limited resources,"330 and moreover, that class actions may help the CAVC
address longstanding criticism regarding its failure to issue precedential
decisions.3 31
The Monk decision is an important opinion in veterans' law. Within one day
of the decision, the first attorney requested aggregation before the CAVC, 332 and
within one month, the court itself had invited an application for class treatment
in another case.3 33 The CAVC is now grappling with consequential second-order
questions, such as the appropriate standard for aggregation, the means for
judicial management of discovery and motion practice, and the scope and nature
of remedies that may be ordered. The CAVC has a wealth of models on which
328 Id. at 1318-19 (discussing United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1115
(2d Cir. 1974) (holding that collective habeas action is permissible, even though Rule 23 does
not apply)). Other courts have also agreed that implementing a collective action rule in the
habeas context, pursuant to the All Writs Act, is sensible, manageable, and just. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 220-22 (7th Cir. 1976) (authorizing
representative habeas action by state prisoners); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 827 n.2
(10th Cir. 1976) (noting Rule 23 is "technically inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings,"
but holding "court may ... apply an analogous procedure by reference to Rule 23 in proper
circumstances").
329 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1319-22.
330 Id. at 1320. An amicus brief submitted by former VA General Counsels made this same
point. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Former General Counsels of the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), Will A. Gunn and Mary Lou Keener at 11-18, Monk, 855 F.3d at 1312
(Nos. 15-7092, 15-7106).
331 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321 & n.6 (noting that in 2014, the CAVC decided 1615 appeals in
single-judge non-precedential decisions, and only thirty-five appeals were decided by a
precedential multi-judge panel or the full court); cf Ridgway, Stichman & Riley, supra note
146, at 11-20 (criticizing CAVC for infrequent publication of panel or precedential decisions).
332 Motion for Aggregate Action, Rosinski v. Shulkin, No. 17-1117, 2017 WL 3033614
(Vet. App. July 18, 2017). The CAVC panel subsequently invited submission of amicus briefs
by interested parties, a step rarely taken by that court. Rosinski, 2017 WL 3033614.
313 Montemayor v. Shulkin, No. 15-1709, 2017 WL 2260125, at *5 (Vet. App. May 24,
2017) ("The Court notes that counsel for the appellant represents numerous veterans alleged
to have been involved in fraud at RMTU .... [T]he Court does possess class action
authority.... If the appellant believes that consolidating these matters is still appropriate, he
should petition the Court for class certification." (citations omitted)).
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to draw,334 whether it proceeds by judicial rulemaking, case-by-case
adjudication, or as other courts have wisely done, both.335
From the perspective of veterans' law exceptionalism, it will be a profoundly
positive development for the CAVC to move beyond the sort of formalistic
analysis of Harrison, American Legion, and McKinney so as to implement class
action rules and deploy them in appropriate cases. As Judge Reyna observed in
Monk, the CAVC's denial of any aggregation power abetted the VA in evading
review of the backlog of claims, "because the VA usually acts promptly to
resolve mandamus petitions."336 The exceptional treatment of disabled veterans
as singularly incapable of aggregating like claims has ill served former service
members and stands out as exceptional in an era of judicial and agency
adaptation to the demands of modem mass adjudication.
III. EXCEPTIONALISM AND "BAD PAPER" DISCHARGES
The final civil rights issue of veterans examined here does not concern the
VA, but rather the record correction and discharge review boards of the DoD.
Veterans who seek to upgrade a bad paper discharge or otherwise need to correct
an improper or stigmatizing reason for discharge must apply to these boards.337
334 See ICHAEL SANT'AMBROGIO & ADAM ZIMMERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES: AGGREGATE AGENCY ADJUDICATION 67 (2016) (recommending use
of aggregation techniques in administrative adjudication of claims); Sant'Ambrogio &
Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 2035-66 (discussing how class action or quasi class action can
improve access, efficiency, and consistency).
33 For instance, in Quinault Allottee Ass'n & Individual Allottees v. United States, 453
F.2d 1272 (Ct. Cl. 1972), the Court of Claims approved representative actions, though the
court lacked a Rule 23 equivalent. Id. at 1274-76. After addressing questions such as the
standard for aggregation in case-by-case decisions, the Court eventually promulgated a rule
that "adopts the criteria for certifying and maintaining a class action as set forth in [Quinault]."
FED. CL. R. 23 rules committee's note to 2002 revision. The Court of Federal Claims has done
the same, Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-
162V, 2009 WL 332044, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) ("[A]pplying evidence developed in
the context of one or more individual cases to other cases involving the same vaccine and the
same or similar injury."). Article I courts such as the bankruptcy and tax courts have also
recognized that they possess inherent judicial powers which may be deployed to fashion
procedural rules appropriate for the cases before them. Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230
F.3d 439, 444-45 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that a bankruptcy court has the authority to
exercise its equitable powers, where necessary or appropriate, to facilitate the implementation
of the Bankruptcy Code); Bokum v. Comm'r, 992 F.2d 1136, 1140 (11th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that a tax court has the power to consider an equitable estoppel claim). See
generally Sant'Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 2041-48 (discussing aggregation
strategies in administrative courts and other proceedings outside Rule 23).
336 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1320-21.
1 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552-1553 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary to establish review boards
to review discharges or dismissals).
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They have received little attention from legal scholarS338 but are now the target
of a significant mobilization by veterans' organizations and their congressional
allies.339
Current campaigns by veterans with bad paper and their allies present
important challenges to the procedural rules and substantive standards by which
these military boards adjudicate cases. These initiatives also raise fundamental
conceptual questions about how courts and Congress should regard these boards.
The DoD has frequently argued for a military law approach, in which deference
to a commanding officer's decisions is nearly inviolate, the military boards apply
a "presumption of regularity," and civilian courts should rarely displace them.340
By contrast, judicial precedent adopts an administrative law approach, in which
internal agency review is not toothless and courts reviewing agency decisions
apply respectful but less deferential APA standards of review.3 41 Many current
proposals would make record correction practices conform more closely to a
veterans' law approach, in which administrative review boards give former
service members the benefit of the doubt and reviewing courts apply canons of
construction in favor of veterans.342 Finally, one might consider the utility of a
civil service approach, in which record correction applications are evaluated
more like wrongful termination claims brought by federal employees before the
Merit Systems Protection Board (the "MSPB").343
In the following Part A, I consider important contemporary campaigns to
reform the record correction process, arising from struggles over PTSD upgrades
and illegal personality and adjustment disorder discharges, and the impact of
338 Legal scholarship examining the military boards is thinner even than that considering
adjudication of VA benefits. But see generally Fidell, supra note 6; Field, supra note 6; Izzo,
supra note 111; Jeffrey M. Glosser & Keith A. Rosenberg, Military Correction Boards:
Administrative Process and Review by the United States Court of Claims, 23 AM. U. L. REV.
391 (1973); John A. Wickham, Federal Court Developments in Military Personnel Law:
Protecting Service Members, 55 NAVAL L. REv. 337 (2008).
133 See, e.g., John Rowan, Opinion, A Less Than Honorable Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30,
2016, at A23 (reporting that Vietnam veterans urged President Obama and President-Elect
Trump to pardon post-9/11 veterans who received less-than-honorable discharges).
340 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss & for
Summary Judgment at 2-4, Cowles v. McHugh, No. 3:13-cv-01741, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138927
(D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2014) (arguing for greater judicial deference to military board decisions
than ordinary APA review).
341 See, e.g., Blassingame v. Sec'y of Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1987) (mirroring
the standard of review approximately to the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA).
342 Fairness for Veterans Act of 2016, H.R. 4683, 114th Cong. § 2 (creating a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the former member); S. 1567, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); see also
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 535, 130
Stat. 2000, 2123 (2016) (requiring that discharge review boards give "liberal consideration"
to PTSD-based upgrade applications).
343 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214-1215 (2012).
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veterans' law exceptionalism on these efforts. In Part B, I conclude with some
thoughts regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the potential frameworks for
review of bad discharges.
A. Contemporary Record Correction Campaigns
Poor staffing, little training, lack of transparency, and neglect by senior DoD
officials have likely contributed to the diminished quality of board adjudications
in recent years. It also appears that lingering skepticism about mental health
disorders and hostility towards the Vietnam generation and those who complain
of sexual assault and other forms of bias have made successful upgrade
applications quite rare. Of course, the armed forces have long struggled to
diagnose, treat, and fairly take account of mental health disorders and injuries.
3 "
In the current era, however, campaigns by veterans and their advocates to
improve the quality of military board adjudications have exposed the failings of
these boards and put at issue the underlying conceptual framework in which they
operate. In so doing, these campaigns highlight the ways in which veterans' law
exceptionalism can frustrate reforms to modernize military administrative
agencies.
1. Bad Paper for Veterans with PTSD or TBI
More than 250,000 Vietnam veterans received bad paper discharges,34
5 and
over 125,000 service members have received bad paper since 2001.346 As the
military continues to downsize in the aftermath of combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the number of bad paper discharges will likely increase.
Many of these veterans received a bad discharge based on misconduct
attributable to PTSD or TBI that was undiagnosed at the time of separation.
347
This is true especially, but not only, for Vietnam veterans, because PTSD did
not exist as a medical diagnosis until 1980.348 PTSD was widespread during the
31 See Mark C. Russell, Bonnie Zinn & Charles R. Figley, Exploring Options Including
Class Action to Transform Military Mental Healthcare and End the Generational Cycle of
Preventable Wartime Behavioral Health Crises, 9 PSYCHOL. INi. & L. 166, 167 (2016)
(describing "a clear pattern of self-inflicted or preventable crises caused primarily by the
military's repetitive neglect and failure to learn from its own documented lessons of war
trauma").
345 NICOSIA, supra note 55, at 299-300 (describing the quantity of bad paper discharges
resulting from the Vietnam War); Phillip Carter, Opinion, The Vets We Reject and Ignore,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 2013, at A25 ("Approximately 260,000 of the 8.7 million Vietnam-era
veterans were pushed out of the service with bad paper.").
3" UNDERSERVED, supra note 65, at 2.
34 Id. at 13 (describing how PTSD and TBI can be incorrectly perceived as bad behavior
by military commanders).
348 Am. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-III-R 236-38 (3d ed. 1980).
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Vietnam War, injuring nearly one-third of those who served,349 and even today
the military often fails to diagnose it among service members. Undiagnosed,
untreated PTSD has frequently impaired the ability of a service member to
perform his duties, eventually leading to a bad paper discharge, which in turn
makes the veteran ineligible for VA care and benefits for the very wound that
prompted the bad discharge.
When Vietnam veterans applied to the record correction boards for an
upgrade, explaining that a post-1980 diagnosis of PTSD provided good cause
for their in-service misconduct, they met near-categorical denials. From 2003 to
2014, for instance, the Army denied 98% of all applications from Vietnam
veterans alleging service-connected PTSD and seeking to upgrade an other-than-
honorable discharge.350 This denial rate far exceeded the rates of denial for other
applications to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (the
"ABCMR") and other boards.
The contemporary campaign to correct bad paper discharges for Vietnam
veterans with undiagnosed PTSD has been led by VVA, which has pursued
litigation, legislation, and regulatory change.351 In 2012, VVA sought to
intervene in the lawsuit of John Shepherd, a Vietnam veteran with PTSD who
sought judicial review of the Army's denial of his upgrade application and
proposed to bring a nationwide class action on behalf of Vietnam veterans with
undiagnosed PTSD and an other-than-honorable discharge.352 The Army settled
with Shepherd before VVA's motion to intervene was decided or a class was
certified,353 but VVA refiled the action in early 2014, together with five
individual veterans and the National Veterans Council for Legal Redress
("NVCLR"). 354 The proposed nationwide class action raised claims under the
APA, Due Process Clause, and Rehabilitation Act, and it sought to compel the
record correction boards to review, pursuant to medically appropriate standards,
3 RICHARD A. KULKA ET AL., CONTRACTUAL REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIETNAM VETERANS READJUSTMENT STUDY VOLUME I: ExECUIvE SUMMARY, DESCRIPTION
OF FINDINGS, AND TECHNICAL APPENDICES 2 (1988), available at http://www.ptsd.va.gov/
professional/research-bio/research/nvvrs-docs.asp [https://perma.cc/28RL-XRBW] (finding
that 30.6% of men and 26.9% of women who served in Vietnam thereafter suffered from
PTSD at some point in their lives).
350 Izzo, supra note 111, at 1591-92 (finding Army board approved two applications out
of approximately 145).
15' The National Veterans Council for Legal Redress ("NVCLR") and High Ground
Veterans Advocacy have played critical roles as well.
352 Izzo, supra note 111, at 1591-92.
353 John Christoffersen, Vietnam Vet Wins Discharge Upgrade in PTSD Lawsuit,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4, 2013; Thomas MacMillan, John Shepherd is Honorable, NEW
HAVEN INDEP. (Nov. 4, 2013, 3:27 PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/
archives/entry/john shepherd _is honorable/ [https://perma.cc/8WD6-94CH].
354 See Complaint, supra note 126, at 1-3.
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all other-than-honorable discharges issued to Vietnam veterans later diagnosed
with PTSD.3 55
In addition to litigation, VVA pursued public education and legislative and
regulatory reform. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Chuck Hagel, later the Secretary of Defense, was
questioned by Senator Richard Blumenthal about Vietnam veterans with PTSD
and bad discharges.356 Nominee Hagel pledged to review the problem and
address it. 3 57 In 2014, the day after VVA refiled its proposed class action,
Secretary Hagel again appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
where he acknowledged he had already discussed the new suit with DoD General
Counsel and reaffirmed his commitment to Senator Blumenthal to address the
problem.358 In addition, VVA pursued legislative amendments to the National
Defense Authorization Act ("NDAA") and omnibus veterans bills, seeking to
remedy the record correction boards' failure to recognize and properly
adjudicate the discharge upgrade applications of Vietnam veterans with
PTSD.359 In 2014, Senator Blumenthal succeeded in adding a provision to the
Senate Armed Services Committee NDAA report requiring the DoD to address
procedural reforms to the boards.360 VVA and its allies also worked to bring
public attention to the circumstance of Vietnam veterans with PTSD and their
efforts to secure the benefits and care that their service has eamed.
361
In September 2014, in response to the efforts of Senator Blumenthal, the
Monk v. Mabus suit, advocacy by VVA, the NVCLR, and other veterans'
groups, and increasing media scrutiny, Secretary Hagel instructed the record
correction boards to give "liberal consideration" to discharge upgrade
applications by veterans with PTSD, as well as "special consideration" to any
355 Id. at 36-37.
356 Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, First Session, 113th
Congress: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 89-90 (2013)
(statement of Sen. Richard Blumenthal).
357 Id. (statement of Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense).
358 Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 and the
Future Years Defense Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong.
120 (2014) (statement of Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense).
35 A draft of proposed legislation is on file with author.
360 See S. REP. No. 113-176, at 106-07 (2014) (requiring DoD report); DEP'T OF DEF.,
REPORT: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW OF VIETNAM VETERAN POST TRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER CASES 1 (2014) (detailing the new required procedures).
361 See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: PTSD & Vietnam (Comedy Central
television broadcast Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/ng47v2/the-daily-show-
with-jon-stewart-ptsd---vietnam [https://perma.cc/QAS4-58WK] (featuring two Monk v.
Mabus plaintiffs and two law students).
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VA diagnosis of service-connected PTSD.362 The instruction, known as the
"Hagel Memo," also directed the boards to be generous in waiving any
applicable statutes of limitations, and ordered the DoD to conduct a "public
messaging campaign ... throughout 2014 and 2015."363
The Hagel Memo was necessarily predicated on a recognition that the boards,
in denying nearly all PTSD applications, had failed the veterans they were
established to serve. And while the Hagel Memo expressly addressed only one
category of veterans-Vietnam veterans with PTSD-it made plain that board
procedures and the overall quality of adjudications were unsatisfactory. The
memo did not impose any of the procedural reforms described in the NDAA
Senate Committee report364 or that had begun to appear in various bills proposed
in Congress.365
Upon issuance of the Hagel Memo, the district court dismissed Monk v.
Mabus without prejudice, giving the boards an opportunity to redo their PTSD
cases.366 Following the dismissal, all five individual plaintiffs received an
upgrade from their respective boards.367 In 2015, VVA and NVCLR submitted
and then litigated FOIA requests to monitor board compliance with the Hagel
Memo, 368 and the Senate Armed Services Committee also required further DoD
reporting on adjudication of PTSD cases.369
362 SEC'Y OF DEF., MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS:
SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE TO MILITARY BOARDS FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY/NAVAL
RECORDS CONSIDERING DISCHARGE UPGRADE REQUESTS BY VETERANS CLAIMING POST
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (2014) [hereinafter HAGEL MEMO]; Dave Philipps, New Rules
May Aid Veterans of Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, at A15.
363 HAGEL MEMO, supra note 362, at 1, 3.
' See S. REP. No. 113-176, at 106-07.
36s See, e.g., Martin C. Evans, Gillibrand Bill-Backed by a Soldier from LI Who Survived
a Suicide Try-Aims to Give Veterans with Mental Health Issues a Fighting Chance,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 2014, at A14.
36 Order on Motion for a Voluntary Remand at 3, Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14-cv-00260
(D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2014), ECF No. 48.
367 Peggy McCarthy, Vietnam Veterans Declared Eligible to Receive Long-Denied
Benefits, HARTFORD COURANT (June 22, 2015), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/
hc-vietnam-vets-benefits-yale-law-clinic-20150622-story.html [https://perma.cc/S68N-
RNET] (reporting the upgrades of five plaintiffs).
368 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Dep't of
Def., No. 3:15-cv-00658 (D. Conn. filed May 4, 2015) (alleging that the DoD failed to
disclose records regarding Hagel Memo compliance, in violation of FOIA).
369 See S. REP. No. 114-49, at 136-37 (2015) (requiring DoD report); DEP'T OF DEF.,
REPORT: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW OF PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF DISCHARGE OR
DISMISSAL FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF VETERANS WITH MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES CONNECTED
WITH POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER OR TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 2 (2015) (reporting
on the progress of the cases).
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An analysis of the first year of board adjudications under the Hagel Memo
from the data obtained in VVA and NVCLR FOIA suit showed dramatic
improvement. Prior to 2014 the Army, the largest service branch, had granted
only 4.6% of applications from Vietnam veterans based on PTSD; during the
first year after the Memo's issuance, the Army approved 67% of applications
that were accompanied by at least some evidence of PTSD.370 Unfortunately, the
same analysis concluded the DoD had failed to conduct a meaningful outreach
campaign, leaving tens of thousands of disabled, often elderly veterans unaware
that they might benefit from the Hagel Memo.371 Subsequent DoD disclosures
suggest board approval rates may already be backsliding.372
Crucially, Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have also begun to mobilize for
fairer treatment of PTSD-based claims before the discharge review boards.
373
These younger veterans achieved the introduction of bipartisan legislation to
reform the DRBs, which included establishing a rebuttable presumption in favor
of a service member seeking a PTSD-based upgrade.374 Congress failed to enact
the Fairness for Veterans Act in 2015, but VVA and younger veteran leaders
achieved a major victory by winning enactment of several key provisions in the
2017 NDAA.37 5 These include codifying the Hagel Memo requirement that
PTSD-based upgrade requests receive "liberal consideration" at the discharge
370 SUNDIATA SIDIBE & FRANCISCO UNGER, UNFINISHED BusiNEss: CORRECTING "BAD
PAPER" FOR VETERANS WITH PTSD 2 (2015).
371 Id. at 8-9 (criticizing the DoD's "perfunctory and inadequate" outreach efforts).
372 The DoD started to disclose statistics regarding PTSD upgrade applications on a
quarterly basis following the settlement of the FOIA suit, and the statistics indicated a
diminished approval rate. See Letter from Mark H. Herrington, Assoc. Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Dep't of Def., to Michael Wishnie, Dir., Jerome N. Frank Legal Servs. Org. (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/clinic/vlsc vva-v_dod-firsLquarter-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NB5A-B3PT] (showing approximately 20% grant rate); Letter from Mark
H. Herrington, Assoc. Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep't ofDef., to Michael Wishnie, Dir., Jerome
N. Frank Legal Servs. Org. (July 27, 2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/
area/clinic/document/vva vdod.second-quarter_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3T5-XSC8]
(showing approximately 23% grant rate); Letter from Mark H. Herrington, Assoc. Deputy
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., to Michael Wishnie, Dir., Jerome N. Frank Legal Servs. Org.
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/clinic/vva-v._dodthirdquarter
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CCQ-NBFT] (showing approximately 31% grant rate).
373 See, e.g., Liz Fields, After Being Punished for His Suicide Attempt, a US Veteran Is
Fighting for Others with PTSD, VICE NEwS (Feb. 10, 2016), https://news.vice.com/
article/after-being-punished-for-his-suicide-attempt-a-us-veteran-is-fighting-for-others-with-
ptsd [https://perma.cc/2XS6-Q6N3] (describing campaign led by Iraq veteran Kris Goldsmith
to reform discharge review process); Philipps, supra note 109.
3 Fairness for Veterans Act of 2016, H.R. 4683, 114th Cong. § 2; S. 1567, 114th Cong.
§2 (2015).




review boardS376 and codifying, as ongoing disclosure requirements of data and
statistics, the provisions of the settlement in Vietnam Veterans of America v.
Department of Defense.377 The 2017 NDAA thus ensures that no future
Secretary can repeal the Hagel Memo protections with a stroke of the pen.37 8
Other provisions of the 2017 NDAA enhance protections for sexual assault
victims in discharge proceedings and for whistleblowers at the BCMRs,379 but
these measures fall short of more protective legislation that had been introduced
to grant greater whistleblower protections to service members who report sexual
harassment or assault.380
The 2016 congressional reforms are important, but the DoD continues to
refuse to provide individual notice to veterans who might benefit from the new
"liberal consideration," prompting at least one state to undertake its own effort
to reach its residents with bad paper,38 1 and leading VVA to launch a campaign
376 Id. § 535, 130 Stat. at 2123-24 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1553).
377 Compare Stipulation of Settlement & Proposed Order at 2-3, Viet. Veterans of Am. v.
Dep't of Def., No. 3:15-cv-00658 (D. Conn. dismissed Jan. 6, 2016) (requiring quarterly
reporting of PTSD applications received, granted, and denied by each service board), with
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 130 Stat. at 2121-22, (amending
10 U.S.C. §§ 1552-1553) (adding nearly identical public disclosure requirements and
procedures).
378 In addition, in February 2016, acting Principal Under-Secretary of Defense for
Personnel Brad Carson directed the DRBs and BCMRs to apply the Hagel Memo beyond
Vietnam cases, waive statutes of limitations, and grant de novo review to those previously
denied an upgrade. Leo Shane III, Legislation Would Halt Bad Military Discharges Due to
PTSD or TBI, MIL. TIMEs (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.militarytimes.com/
story/military/2016/03/07/bad-paper-discharges-ptsd-tbil81445920/ [https://perma.cc/C9ZJ-
69TA] ("The new memo would expand [the Hagel Memo's coverage] to all veterans, and
waive statutes of limitations for those appeals."). In June 2016, Secretary of the Navy Ray
Mabus barred administrative separations for sailors and Marines with PTSD or TBI unless
they received a disability evaluation. Lance M. Bacon, New Policy Protects Marines, Sailors
Facing Separation for Mental Health Issues, MARINE CoRPs TIMEs (June 8, 2016),
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2016/06/08/new-policy-protects-marines-
sailors-facing-separation-mental-heath-issues/85609534/ [https://perma.cc/6J5A-AJZ8].
379 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, §§ 524, 531 (adding
language to cover consideration of sexual assault victim in connection with administrative
separation procedures and improving whistleblower protection procedures).
380 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, S. 2943, 114th Cong.
§§ 543-49 (2016) (providing whistleblower protection for persons who report sexual
harassment or assault); HRW, Booted, supra note 107 (describing an erroneous mental health
discharge as the "ultimate retaliation" because of its stigma and devastating consequences).
381 Peggy McCarthy, Connecticut o Help PTSD Vets Upgrade 'Bad Paper' Discharges,
HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-vets-
discharges-ptsd-20161116-story.html [https://perma.cc/U7RU-MTLH] (describing the
efforts of the State of Connecticut and local groups to inform veterans with bad paper of
opportunity to apply for discharge upgrade under the Hagel Memo).
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calling on the president to issue a mass pardon to veterans with PTSD, similar
to the programs ordered by Presidents Ford and Carter.382 In early 2017, Iraq
and Afghanistan veterans followed in the footsteps of Conley Monk and the
Vietnam generation, filing suit in an effort to compel full implementation of the
Hagel Memo and 2017 NDAA on behalf of nearly 60,000 Army veterans with
PTSD and bad paper.383
The effort to make the record correction boards more responsive to the
situation of veterans with PTSD and bad paper has led to significant changes.
The most important legacy of these campaigns, however, may be to make visible
the suffering of bad paper veterans384 and the longstanding structural deficits of
the boards, in both their procedural rules and substantive adjudications. A
second, less uccessful campaign, however, demonstrates that the administrative
separation process and board failures are not limited to hostility towards veterans
with PTSD.
2. Illegal Personality Disorder and Adjustment Disorder Discharges
In 2007, a reporter for The Nation reported on a surge in "personality
disorder" discharges from the armed forces.385 "Personality disorders are a class
of mental health disorders characterized by individuals' inflexible, socially
inappropriate behaviors across diverse situations."386 The existence of a
personality disorder is not necessarily inconsistent with military service,387 but
since 2001, the military has discharged tens of thousands of people on this
382 Rowan, supra note 339 (calling for mass pardon for veterans with OTH); Leo Shane
III, Advocates Want Obama, Trump to Pardon 'Bad Paper'Dismissals, MIL. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2016), http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/vva-letter-trump-obama-bad-paper
[https://perma.cc/L9G7-HZCS] (describing VVA request to Presidents Barack Obama and
Donald Trump urging pardons for service members discharged for mental health-related
infractions).
383 Meghann Myers, Veterans with PTSD Are Suing the Army to Have Their Discharges
Upgraded, ARMY TIMEs (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.armytimes.com/articles/veterans-with-
ptsd-are-suing-the-army-to-have-their-discharges-upgraded [https://perma.cc/NWK3-28PA]
(reporting on Kennedy v. Speer, a proposed federal class-action filed by Army veterans of
Iraq and Afghanistan seeking fair adjudication of PTSD-based discharge upgrade
applications).
384 See, e.g., ALI R. TAYYEB & JENNIFER GREENBURG, WATSON INST. ON INT'L & PUB.
AFFAIRS, "BAD PAPERS": THE INVISIBLE AND INCREASING COSTS OF WAR FOR EXCLUDED
VETERANS 6-10 (2017) (summarizing effects of bad paper).
385 Kors, supra note 110, at 12.
386 ADER, supra note 110, at 2.
387 DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMIMSTRATIVE SEPARATIONS 12
(Jan. 27, 2014) (enumerating the narrow set of circumstances in which separation on the basis
of a personality disorder is authorized, including a requirement that "the disorder [be] so




basis.388 These discharges are often made under honorable conditions, but
recorded as based on an alleged personality disorder.389 Because many oung
service members focus only on the discharge status, they may not contest the
narrative reason for separation.390 Yet the VA treats a personality disorder as a
pre-existing condition, and many private employers hesitate to hire someone
whose discharge paperwork indicates a severe mental health disorder.391
In fact, as congressional hearings as well as government and private analyses
confirmed, nearly all of the post-2001 personality disorder discharges have been
unlawful.392 Many involved a medical misdiagnosis-service members
suffering from PTSD, TBI, or nothing at all have been diagnosed with
personality disorder and discharged.393 And nearly all involve violations of
various DoD regulations and instructions to protect service members from hasty
or wrongful discharges.394 Moreover, after public attention to unlawful
personality disorders, the service branches began to reduce the practice395-but
declined to review the discharge status of tens of thousands of service members
388 Kelly Kennedy, Changes Sought for Vets' Psych Disorder Discharges, USA TODAY
(Nov. 28, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/28/psych-
disorder-discharges/1729145/ [https://perma.cc/T3HH-VE47] (noting that nearly 30,000
people have been discharged on the basis of having a personality disorder).
389 See GAO-09-31, supra note 110, at 11 n.20 ("[E]nlisted servicemembers who are
separated because of a personality disorder receive either an 'honorable' or 'general under
honorable' characterization of service that is given at the time of separation.").
9 See Kors, supra note 110, at 12-13.
391 See GAO-09-31, supra note 110, at 11 (reporting that employers may take into
consideration the veteran's discharge for a personality disorder).
392 See Personality Disorder Discharges: Impact on Veterans' Benefits: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 111th Cong. 1-2 (2010) (statement of Rep. Bob Filner,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs) (describing accounts that the DoD is continuing
to employ wrongful personality disorder discharges despite the committee's previous work to
expose the problem); GAO-10-1013T, supra note 110, at 8 (concluding that the military
services did not fully comply with the DoD's personality disorder separation requirements);
GAO-09-3 1, supra note 110, at 2 (concluding that the DoD had "low rates of compliance");
ADER, supra note 110, at 2 (finding that only 8.9% of personality disorder discharges were
properly handled in 2008-09); BOGHOSSIAN, supra note 110, at 1 (finding that the Coast Guard
has routinely violated its regulations regarding personality disorder discharges).
393 See ADER, supra note 110, at 2 (claiming that a substantial number of discharges may
be based on a substantive misdiagnosis); BOGHOSSIAN, supra note 110, at 1 (discussing the
concern first emerging in 2007 that "the military may purposely misdiagnose soldiers in order
to cheat them out of a lifetime of benefits, thereby saving billions in expenses").
394 See ADER, supra note 110, at 2 (discussing the GAO's findings of systematic
noncompliance with requirements for discharges based on personality disorder);
BOGHOSSIAN, supra note 110, at 1.
39 See ADER, supra note 110, at 3 (noting the drop in personality disorder discharge rates
following media scrutiny in 2007 and 2008).
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separated on this ground since 2001.396 There is evidence that the numbers of
"adjustment disorder" discharges began to increase instead.397
For instance, after suing the DoD for its refusal to disclose records regarding
personality and adjustment disorder discharges,398 VVA found that more than
31,000 service members were discharged for an alleged personality disorder
between fiscal years 2001 and 2010, substantially more than the 26,000
discharges estimated by Government Accountability Office for 2001 to 2007.399
But, as personality disorder separations declined following media and
congressional attention, "the military discharged a substantial number of persons
on the alleged ground of an adjustment disorder.""o Moreover, internal reviews
by the DoD confirmed that nearly all personality disorder discharges were done
in violation of military rules and regulations designed to protect service
members.401 "This does not paint a pretty picture," concluded one DoD reviewer,
who calculated that only 8.9% of personality disorder discharges were
"processed properly" from 2008 to 2009.402
A subsequent analysis confirmed that one service branch, the Coast Guard,
"routinely violated procedures intended to protect service members from
erroneous discharges for personality disorder . .. and adjustment disorder."03
Coast Guard data revealed that 96% (255/265) of a random sample of personality
and adjustment disorder discharges "failed to comply with Coast Guard
regulations."404 Since 2009, personality disorder discharges have declined and
adjustment disorder discharges in the Coast Guard have soared.405
396 See id. at 10 ("To date, the military has taken no meaningful steps to redress the illegal
discharge of tens of thousands of service members from FY01 to FY07.").
39 See id. at 14 (discussing the simultaneous rise in adjustment disorder discharges during
the period in which personality disorder discharges decreased); BOGHOSSIAN, supra note 110,
at 2 (discussing the concern that he DoD increased adjustment disorder discharges in order
to compensate for a decrease in personality disorder discharges).
' Viet. Veterans of Am. Conn. Greater Hartford Chapter 120 v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
8 F. Supp. 3d 188 (D. Conn. 2014) (denying government motion for summary judgment in
substantial part, in suit to compel the release of records regarding personality disorder
discharges); Viet. Veterans of Am. Conn. Greater Hartford Chapter 120 v. U.S. Dep't of Def.,
10 F. Supp. 3d 245 (D. Conn. 2014) (denying government motion to dismiss suit to compel
disclosure of records regarding personality disorder discharges).
399 ADER, supra note 110, at 3.
400 Id.; id. at 13-14 & tbl.3 (describing the quantitative rise in adjustment disorder
discharges among the service branches).
40' See id. at 3 ("Internal reviews by the DoD services for FYO8-10 found hundreds of
illegal [personality disorder] discharges.").
402 Id. at 2 (quoting Memorandum from CAPT Falardeau, L.O., to Chief of Naval Pers.
(undated) (on file with authors)).
401 BOGHOSSIAN, supra note 110, at 1.
404 Id.
40 Id. at 1-2, 12.
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The DoD has resisted efforts to address its illegal personality disorder
discharge problem. Legislation requiring medically appropriate review has
languished,406 and agency officials have ignored regulatory reforms proposed by
VVA and others.407 Instead, individual veterans have been left to fend for
themselves, trying to explain to employers, the VA, and family members why
their discharge paperwork marks them as suffering from a permanent, severe,
and pre-existing mental health disorder.408
In these cases as well, the record correction boards have often failed veterans.
Accustomed to routine denials of mental health-based applications, without
scrutiny from the media or courts, the ABCMR has rejected record correction
applications with the same boilerplate decisions familiar to veterans with
PTSD.409 One analysis concluded that the ABCMR had denied 100% of
applications from recently-separated veterans discharged for an alleged
adjustment disorder who then sought to correct the narrative reason for discharge
based on a subsequent diagnosis of PTSD.4 10 And in a case challenging an illegal
adjustment disorder discharge, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut held that, under Army regulations, it was unlawful to discharge a
service member "without allowing up to six months to determine if he in fact
had [adjustment disorder]" rather than PTSD.4 11
Congress established the record correction boards to replace private
legislative petitions. The statutes it enacted sought to balance the need to
preserve maximum flexibility for the commanding officer on the battlefield with
concern for the welfare of the "boy [or girl who] gets into trouble"412 and should
not suffer a lifetime stigma as a result. The refusal of the record correction boards
to fairly address the unlawful use of personality and adjustment disorder
discharges is inconsistent with this congressional purpose. The mishandling of
these cases, with lifetime consequences for thousands of service members and
406 See, e.g., Servicemember Mental Health Review Act, H.R. 6574, 112th Cong. § 1554b
(2012) (requiring that previous separations based on personality disorder or adjustment
disorder be reviewed).
0 See ADER, supra note 110, at 15 (recommending appointment of a panel of senior
officers to review personality and adjustment disorder discharges ince 2001).
4" See James Dao, Branding a Soldier with 'Personality Disorder,'N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25,
2012, at Al (reporting on a veteran's fight to remove her personality disorder diagnosis as
part of her final discharge process).
` Complaint at 8-9, Cowles v. McHugh, No. 3:13-cv-01741, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
138927 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2014) (alleging, inter alia, that the ABCMR's decision included
only "boilerplate language" and failed to provide a solider with the opportunity to improve
his performance).
410 Id. at 10.
411 Cowles v. McHugh, No. 3:13-cv-01741, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138927, at *31
(D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2014).
412 78 CONG. REC. 4538 (1944) (statement of Rep. Cunningham).
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their families, reveals not only a sad instance of agency failure but also a
fundamental disagreement about the role of these boards.
B. Conceptualizing Record Correction Reform
The armed forces have issued hundreds of thousands of bad paper discharges,
many in haste, based on racial animus, in retaliation for reports of sexual
harassment or assault, based on now-unlawful grounds such as homosexuality
or misconduct attributable to undiagnosed PTSD, and in violation of legal rules
or best medical practices.4 13 When veterans have sought redress, they have faced
hostile boards that summarily deny applications, refuse to permit them to appear
in person, rely on secret evidence, and dispense a sort of third-rate "justice" that
would be unacceptable in nearly any other administrative law setting.
414
The military appears to believe the boards should function as if subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Speaking broadly, military law reflects a
substantial deference to decentralized command decisions, in which post-hoc
review rarely results in reversing choices made in the field. The DoD emphasizes
that "[the] BCM/NRs are not courts, nor are they investigative agencies."
415
Notwithstanding the broad statutory authority to "correct an error or remove an
injustice," 416 the boards proceed from a "presumption of regularity"417 as to the
proceedings that led to a veteran's discharge. Where a veteran seeks judicial
review of an adverse board decision pursuant to the APA, the DoD has argued
for "increased deference," beyond the usual deference due in APA review, in
light of the tradition of civilian courts abstaining from close scrutiny of military
decisions.418 If one were to adopt a military law conception of the role of the
record correction boards, then the substantive and procedural criticisms leveled
by veterans and their advocates would not carry much force. On this view,
decisions by commanding officers in the field should rarely be reversed, robust
procedural protections are unnecessary, and civilian courts should not intervene.
An administrative law conception of the boards, by contrast, would take the
criticisms more seriously. A system of internal review that merely rubber-stamps
past decisions in boiler-plate denials of applications is of little utility; the
absence of procedural fairness undermines faith in the system and acceptance of
the outcomes;4 19 and reviewing courts should not grant special or heightened
413 See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing the history of
discriminatory discharge practices).
414 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (discussing the hostile procedural
practices employed by the BCMR).
415 HAGEL MEMO, supra note 362, at 1.
416 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (2012).
417 32 C.F.R. § 70.8(b)(12)(vi) (2016).
418 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss & for
Summary Judgment, supra note 340, at 8.
419 Tyler, supra note 157, at 283-87.
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deference to agency expertise, beyond the usual deference afforded under the
APA's arbitrary and capricious standard.420 Values of consistency, efficiency,
transparency, and fair procedures would be more central to the board
adjudications and any judicial review thereof. The boards would be subject not
only to hierarchical accountability within the DoD, as under a military law
approach; they would also be accountable to individual veterans, enforced via
judicial review, and to elected officials, as with other agencies.421
A third possible conception of the boards might be termed a "veterans' law"
framework. Under this view-urged by contemporary advocates and reflected
in part in legislative proposals like the Fairness for Veterans Act and the Hagel
Memo--veterans applying for a discharge upgrade should receive more
generous treatment. Statutory ambiguities would be construed in favor of the
veteran;422 the "presumption of regularity" would be eliminated, and evidentiary
presumptions in favor of the veteran would substitute instead;423 where no
presumption applies, the burden of proof would be merely equipoise;424 and
civilian courts might grant even less deference than under ordinary APA review.
The Hagel Memo's directive that the boards afford "liberal consideration" to
certain PTSD-based upgrade applications, codified in the 2017 NDAA, is
consonant with this approach, as are recent bills proposing to establish
presumptions before the boards similar to those applied often by the VA to
disability benefits applications.425
One might object that adopting a veterans' law framework in record
correction proceedings would entrench the very veterans' exceptionalism
criticized in this paper, but that objection would miss the mark. Commanding
officers should retain wide discretion in the field to swiftly remove an
underperforming unit member. To ensure that such decisions--often made by
young officers under stress, with little time for reflection or detailed medical
input-do not work a lifetime injustice against a young service member,
Congress tempered this discretion with a robust set of post-hoc protections at the
420 See, e.g., Blassingame v. Sec'y of the Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding
record correction board decisions subject to APA review); Remmie v. Mabus, 898 F. Supp.
2d 108, 118 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying APA standard of review to BCNR decision).
421 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded
Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1378 (2010) (explaining "overlapping accountability regimes").
422 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117-18 (1994) (construing ambiguous statutory terms
in favor of veterans).
423 See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2016) (establishing presumption of service connection
when PTSD is attributable to specified stressors).
424 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012) (stating that the veteran should receive "the benefit of the
doubt" where evidence is in equipoise).
425 See Fairness for Veterans Act of 2016, H.R. 4683, 114th Cong.; S. 1567, 114th Cong.
(2015).
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boards.426 The goal was to protect "the boy [and girl] in trouble"427 without
constraining the commanding officers' discretion in the field. To strengthen
those protections, as the Hagel Memo and the 2017 NDAA have done, is to
recalibrate the balance between field decisions and a post-hoc safety net, rather
than to embrace a veterans' law exceptionalism.
Finally, one could imagine a civil service conception of the boards, one that
incorporated principles and practices developed over the past 130 years to
adjudicate disputes of other public employees. For instance, federal employees
other than those in the military typically enjoy "just cause" protection against
termination428 as well as procedural safeguards, including notice of a proposed
adverse action, an opportunity to "answer," representation, and a written
decision.429 Adverse actions are subject to later review before an administrative
judge of the MSPB,430 at which time the agency bears the burden to support its
action by a "preponderance of evidence."431 The MSPB can overturn an adverse
action or mitigate a punishment,432 generally subject to judicial review in the
Federal Circuit.433 Overall, the civil service system reflects the inherent tension
between the dual objectives of protecting worker rights and management
flexibility, 434 a tension present in the military as well.
While the civil service system is not free from criticism,
435 it would not be
anomalous to incorporate its practices more fully into the record correction
426 See discussion supra Section I.C.
427 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the goals behind establishing
record correction and discharge review boards as described by Rep. Cunningham).
428 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012) (forbidding adverse employment action except "for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service").
429 Id. § 7513(b) (outlining the procedural protections to which federal employees are
entitled, including thirty days written notice, reasonable time to answer orally and in writing,
and a written decision).
430 Id. § 7513(d) (granting federal employees the right to appeal to the MSPB).
431 Id. § 7701(c)(1)(B) (establishing a preponderance of the evidence standard for all cases
not based on unacceptable performance).
432 See, e.g., Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313, 313 (1981) (holding the MSPB
may "modify or reduce a penalty imposed on an employee").
413 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (establishing the availability of judicial review of MSPB decisions).
434 See, e.g., Donald P. Moynihan, Protection Versus Flexibility: The Civil Service Reform
Act, Competing Administrative Doctrines, and the Roots of Contemporary Public
Management Debate, 16 J. POL'Y IIST. 1, 1 (2004).
435 See, e.g., Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal
Whistleblowers, 3 WM. & MARY POL'Y REv. 184, 184 (2012) (criticizing "ignominious
record" of failing to protect whistleblowers in civil service system that is biased, insufficiently
independent, and staffed by under-qualified decision-makers); Carten Cordell, How Easy
Should It Be to Fire a Fed?, FED. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 2016, at A14 (describing debate over
proposal to remove senior VA officials from MSPB protection).
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boards. For example, civil service protections for federal whistleblowerS436
might better safeguard those discharged in retaliation for reporting sexual
harassment or assault.437 Other principles from federal employment law might
also guide record correction boards, integrating discharge review cases into the
mainstream of wrongful discharge adjudications in the modem era.438
For years, the DoD has embraced a military law approach to record correction
adjudications. Courts have tended to favor a more traditional administrative law
approach, though judicial opinions have been rare in recent years. There is much
to commend in current reform efforts, which may appear to reflect a veterans'
law framework but which are better understood as managing the tension between
a need for decentralized command flexibility in the field and strong post-hoc
worker protections for veterans.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary veterans confront numerous challenges. The systems
established by Congress to care for wounded warriors and to provide a
meaningful opportunity for veterans with bad paper to "clear up their record"439
are broken. This article identifies four current policy debates and attempts to
provide an analytical framework for understanding and resolving them. One
theme threading through each policy dispute is that of veterans' law
exceptionalism. Past efforts to mainstream veterans programs by FDR,
Eisenhower, and General Bradley failed. Ending recurring problems, however,
such as the DoD's blanket rejection of discharge upgrade applications by
veterans with PTSD or the discriminatory denial of VA benefits applications by
survivors of military sexual assault, might require the fuller integration of
veterans' law with modem approaches to administrative, employment, and other
bodies of law.
436 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (prohibiting adverse employment actions against someone for
disclosing information the employee reasonably believes evidences a violation of law, gross
mismanagement, or abuse of authority).
437 See HRW, Booted, supra note 107 (describing stories of military personnel being given
personality disorder diagnoses in apparent retaliation for reporting sexual assaults and other
abuses); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EMBATTLED: RETALIATING AGAINST SEXUAL
ASSAULT SuRvrvoRs IN THE US MILITARY 27 (2015) (describing the problem of sexual assault
and fear of retaliation for reporting).
438 For instance, in "fraudulent enlistment" cases, record correction boards may uphold a
bad discharge based on information learned after the discharge that a service member failed
to disclose upon enlistment. See, e.g., Acevedo v. United States, 216 F. App'x 977, 979-80
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding a denial of disability retirement due to the applicant's
concealment of his mental condition). By contrast, in employment law, the "after-acquired
evidence" doctrine will not generally eliminate an employer's liability for wrongful discharge,
even though damages may be limited prospectively from the moment of discovery. See, e.g.,
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 352 (1995).
439 78 CONG. REC. 4538 (1944) (statement of Rep. Cunningham).
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No body of law is completely divorced from all others, and as such, any legal
discipline termed "exceptional" is really so only to a degree. Nevertheless, tax,
immigration, and perhaps other fields are fairly characterized as having
sufficiently departed from mainstream administrative or constitutional law
values as to have earned the label. Veterans' law has long been ignored, so much
so that it is typically left off even this list of legal outcasts. Yet like these other
"exceptional" fields, it is a legal backwater, with VA benefits cases segregated
in a specialized Article I court; disabled veterans long denied the opportunity to
ever aggregate their claims, as nearly all other injured litigants might, thus
frustrating efforts to redress extraordinary VA delays; and claims of
discrimination based on disability or sex treated largely outside modem anti-
discrimination paradigms.
So too with record correction cases, the second major category of veterans'
law. Appallingly dysfunctional administrative boards, rarely called to justify
their decisions in court, engage in poor adjudications while systematically
discriminating against certain classes of veterans with bad paper. These low-
quality adjudications are not merely the result of under-resourced boards and
neglect by senior DoD officials, but appear to reflect an insistence on
exceptional deference to military affairs, eschewing modern principles of public
employment or administrative law.
The paradox of veterans' law, however, is that despite the pernicious effects
of its status as a legal backwater, service members (at least those without bad
paper) are eligible for generous disability, housing, health care, education, and
other benefits-far more generous than is available to the general public. But
there is no inherent reason that generous benefits must be combined with
retrograde legal structures and procedures. The benefits are more generous
because they reflect respect for the sacrifice of military service and the special
responsibility of the entire nation to care for those wounded in war. Applying
administrative, constitutional, employment, and anti-discrimination principles
from outside the narrow realm of veterans' law need not threaten these benefits,
nor the appropriately special regard for those "who shall have borne the
battle"440 and the "boy [or girl who] gets into trouble."
I Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, YALE L. SCH. LLLIAN GOLDMAN L.
LIBR. (Mar. 4, 1865), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th-century/lincoln2.asp [https://perma.cc/
39X6-F8US].
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